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  1. added 2018-09-21
    Puzzling Identities, by Vincent Descombes, Translated by Stephen Adam Schwartz.Schwenkler John - 2017 - Mind 126 (503):967-974.
    © Mind Association 2017This rich and engaging book addresses a nest of questions that have been mostly neglected in recent Anglophone philosophy. These questions concern ordinary uses of the concept of identity in speaking for example of identity crises, of one’s identity as something that can be lost or maintained, of identification with certain groups, traits, values, or beliefs, and so on. That there are these uses, and that they are an important feature of contemporary culture, is beyond question: witness (...)
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  2. added 2018-08-05
    7. Subjektivierung der Erfahrung. Zu Deweys Rekonstruktion der Subjektivität.Jörg Volbers - 2017 - In Michael Hampe (ed.), John Dewey: Erfahrung Und Natur. De Gruyter. pp. 97-112.
    The article offers a close reading of chapter 6 of Dewey's 'Experience and Nature'. It explains how Dewey reformulates the classical notion of the subject in pragmatist terms, emphasizing in particular Dewey's idea that 'experience' is not a priori subjective, but rather has to be appropriated by the acting individual in order to become one's own experience in an emphatic sense.
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  3. added 2018-07-07
    The Identity-Enactment Account of Associative Duties.Saba Bazargan-Forward - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    Associative duties are agent-centered duties to give defeasible moral priority to our special ties. Our strongest associative duties are to close friends and family. According to reductionists, our associative duties are just special duties—i.e., duties arising from what I have done to others, or what others have done to me. These include duties to abide by promises and contracts, compensate our benefactors in ways expressing gratitude, and aid those whom we have made especially vulnerable to our conduct. I argue, though, (...)
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  4. added 2018-06-13
    Care, Death, and Time in Heidegger and Frankfurt.B. Scot Rousse - 2016 - In Roman Altshuler & Michael Sigrist (eds.), Time and the Philosophy of Action. New York: Routledge. pp. 225-241.
    Both Martin Heidegger and Harry Frankfurt have argued that the fundamental feature of human identity is care. Both contend that caring is bound up with the fact that we are finite beings related to our own impending death, and both argue that caring has a distinctive, circular and non-instantaneous, temporal structure. In this paper, I explore the way Heidegger and Frankfurt each understand the relations among care, death, and time, and I argue for the superiority of Heideggerian version of this (...)
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  5. added 2017-12-13
    Transfer of Personality to Synthetic Human ("Mind Uploading") and the Social Construction of Identity.John Danaher & Sim Bamford - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (11-12):6-30.
    Humans have long wondered whether they can survive the death of their physical bodies. Some people now look to technology as a means by which this might occur, using terms such 'whole brain emulation', 'mind uploading', and 'substrate independent minds' to describe a set of hypothetical procedures for transferring or emulating the functioning of a human mind on a synthetic substrate. There has been much debate about the philosophical implications of such procedures for personal survival. Most participants to that debate (...)
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  6. added 2016-02-14
    Practical Identity.Benjamin Matheson - 2017 - In Benjamin Matheson & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), Palgrave Handbook of the Afterlife. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 391-411.
    In this paper, I present a dilemma for those who believe in the afterlife: either we won’t survive death (or an eternal life) in the sense that most matters to us or we will become bored if we do. First, I argue that even if we – in a strict sense – survive death, there is practical sense in which we don’t survive death. This applies, I contend, to all accounts of the afterlife that: eventually, we lose our practical identity. (...)
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  7. added 2016-01-24
    Free Will, Narrative, and Retroactive Self-Constitution.Roman Altshuler - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):867-883.
    John Fischer has recently argued that the value of acting freely is the value of self-expression. Drawing on David Velleman’s earlier work, Fischer holds that the value of a life is a narrative value and free will is valuable insofar as it allows us to shape the narrative structure of our lives. This account rests on Fischer’s distinction between regulative control and guidance control. While we lack the former kind of control, on Fischer’s view, the latter is all that is (...)
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  8. added 2016-01-24
    Teleology, Narrative, and Death.Roman Altshuler - 2015 - In John Lippitt & Patrick Stokes (eds.), Narrative, Identity and the Kierkegaardian Self. Edinburgh University Press. pp. 29-45.
    Heidegger, like Kierkegaard, has recently been claimed as a narrativist about selves. From this Heideggerian perspective, we can see how narrative expands upon the psychological view, adding a vital teleological dimension to the understanding of selfhood while denying the reductionism implicit in the psychological approach. Yet the narrative approach also inherits the neo-Lockean emphasis on the past as determining identity, whereas the self is fundamentally about the future. Death is crucial on this picture, not as allowing for the possibility of (...)
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  9. added 2015-08-27
    How to Be a Conventional Person.Kristie Miller - 2004 - The Monist 87 (4):457-474.
    Recent work in personal identity has emphasized the importance of various conventions, or ‘person-directed practices’ in the determination of personal identity. An interesting question arises as to whether we should think that there are any entities that have, in some interesting sense, conventional identity conditions. We think that the best way to understand such work about practices and conventions is the strongest and most radical. If these considerations are correct, persons are, on our view, conventional constructs: they are in part (...)
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  10. added 2015-08-03
    Becoming Oneself Through Failure and Resolution.Jan Bransen - 2012 - In Käthe Schneider (ed.), Becoming Oneself: Dimensions of “Bildung” and the facilitation of personality development. Springer VS-­‐Verlag. pp. 5-28.
    The aim of this chapter is to show how we can account for a most peculiar feature of human life: i.e. the need to address the real possibility of failing to be ourselves.
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  11. added 2012-03-25
    Personal Identity and Practical Reason.Jonny Anomaly - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (2):331.
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