Is Spinoza’s theory of Finite Mind Coherent? – Death, Affectivity and Epistemology in the Ethics

The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy (2017)
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In this paper I examine the question whether Spinoza can account for the necessity of death. I argue that he cannot because within his ethical intellectualist system the subject cannot understand the cause of her death, since by understanding it renders it harmless. Then, I argue that Spinoza could not solve this difficulties because of deeper commitments of his system. At the end I draw a historical parallel to the problem from medieval philosophy.

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Oliver Toth
University of Graz


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