View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

17 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
  1. The Enigma of Spinoza's Amor Dei Intellectualis.Yitzhak Melamed - 2019 - In Noa Naaman-Zaudrer & Noa Naaman (eds.), Freedom, Action and Motivation in Spinoza’s Ethics. Routledge. pp. 222-238.
    The notion of divine love was essential to medieval Christian conceptions of God. Jewish thinkers, though, had a much more ambivalent attitude about this issue. While Maimonides was reluctant to ascribe love, or any other affect, to God, Gersonides and Crescas celebrated God’s love. Though Spinoza is clearly sympathetic to Maimonides’ rejection of divine love as anthropomorphism, he attributes love to God nevertheless, unfolding his notion of amor Dei intellectualis at the conclusion of his Ethics. But is this a legitimate (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2. Affekt Macht Netz. Auf dem Weg zu einer Sozialtheorie der Digitalen Gesellschaft (Hg. Breljak/ Mühlhoff/ Slaby).Rainer Mühlhoff, Anja Breljak & Jan Slaby (eds.) - 2019 - Bielefeld: transcript.
    -/- Shitstorms, Hate Speech oder virale Videos, die zum Klicken, Liken, Teilen bewegen: Die vernetzte Gesellschaft ist von Affekten getrieben und bringt selbst ganz neue Affekte hervor. -/- Die Beiträge des Bandes nehmen die medientechnologischen Entwicklungen unserer Zeit in den Blick und untersuchen sie aus der Perspektive einer kritischen Affekt- und Sozialphilosophie. Sie zeigen: Soziale Medien und digitale Plattformen sind nicht nur Räume des Austauschs, sie erschaffen Affektökonomien – und darin liegt auch ihre Macht. Indem sie neue Formen des sozialen (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3. Affective Societies: Key Concepts.Jan Slaby & Christian von Scheve (eds.) - 2019 - New York: Routledge.
    Affect and emotion have come to dominate discourse on social and political life in the mobile and networked societies of the early 21st century. This volume introduces a unique collection of essential concepts for theorizing and empirically investigating societies as Affective Societies. The concepts engender insights into the affective foundations of social coexistence and are indispensable to comprehend the many areas of conflict linked to emotion such as migration, political populism, or local and global inequalities. Each chapters provides historical orientation; (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  4. Is Spinoza’s Theory of Finite Mind Coherent? – Death, Affectivity and Epistemology in the Ethics.Oliver Istvan Toth - 2017 - The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy.
    In this paper I examine the question whether Spinoza can account for the necessity of death. I argue that he cannot because within his ethical intellectualist system the subject cannot understand the cause of her death, since by understanding it renders it harmless. Then, I argue that Spinoza could not solve this difficulties because of deeper commitments of his system. At the end I draw a historical parallel to the problem from medieval philosophy.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Spinoza on Emotion and Akrasia.Christiaan Remmelzwaal - 2016 - Dissertation, Université de Neuchatel
    The objective of this doctoral dissertation is to interpret the explanation of akrasia that the Dutch philosopher Benedictus Spinoza (1632-1677) gives in his work The Ethics. One is said to act acratically when one intentionally performs an action that one judges to be worse than another action which one believes one might perform instead. In order to interpret Spinoza’s explanation of akrasia, a large part of this dissertation investigates Spinoza’s theory of emotion. The first chapter is introductory and outlines Spinoza’s (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Affect, Desire, and Judgement in Spinoza's Account of Motivation.Justin Steinberg - 2016 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (1):67-87.
    Two priority problems frustrate our understanding of Spinoza on desire [cupiditas]. The first problem concerns the relationship between desire and the other two primary affects, joy [laetitia] and sadness [tristitia]. Desire seems to be the oddball of this troika, not only because, contrary to the very definition of an affect, desires do not themselves consist in changes in one's power of acting, but also because desire seems at once more and less basic than joy and sadness. The second problem concerns (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7. Affects and Activity in Leibniz's De Affectibus.Markku Roinila - 2015 - In Adrian Nita (ed.), Leibniz’s Metaphysics and Adoption of Substantial Forms: Between Continuity and Transformation. Springer. pp. 73-88.
    In this paper I will discuss the doctrine of substance which emerges from Leibniz’s unpublished early memoir De affectibus of 1679. The memoir marks a new stage in Leibniz’s views of the mind. The motivation for this change can be found in Leibniz’s rejection of the Cartesian theory of passion and action in the 1670s. His early Aristotelianism and some features of Cartesianism persisted to which Leibniz added influences from Hobbes and Spinoza. His nascent dynamical concept of substance is seemingly (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. Nietzsche, Spinoza, and the Moral Affects.David Wollenberg - 2013 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 51 (4):617-649.
    Friedrich Nietzsche was Less Well-Read in the history of philosophy than were many of his peers in the pantheon, whether Hegel before him or Heidegger after, but he was not for that reason any less hesitant to pronounce judgment on the worth of the other great philosophers: Plato was “boring”; Descartes was “superficial”; Hobbes, Hume, and Locke signify “a debasement and lowering of the concept of ‘philosophy’ for more than a century”; Kant was an “idiot” and a “catastrophic spider,” etc.1 (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  9. Critical Realism in the Personal Domain: Spinoza and Explanatory Critique of the Emotions.Martin Evenden - 2012 - Journal of Critical Realism 11 (2):163-187.
    Within critical realist circles, the development of knowledge in the natural and social domains has thus far been much stronger by comparison with its respective development within the personal domain. What I want to explore here is how knowledge can be positively used to have emancipatory effects at the level of the individual. The way in which we are able to achieve this is by coming to have what Spinoza calls more adequate ideas of ourselves, other beings, and our place (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Spinoza on Destroying Passions with Reason.Colin Marshall - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):139-160.
    Spinoza claims we can control any passion by forming a more clear and distinct idea of it. The interpretive consensus is that Spinoza is either wrong or over-stating his view. I argue that Spinoza’s view is plausible and insightful. After breaking down Spinoza’s characterization of the relevant act, I consider four existing interpretations and conclude that each is unsatisfactory. I then consider a further problem for Spinoza: how his definitions of ‘action’ and ‘passion’ make room for passions becoming action. I (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  11. Spinoza on Human Freedom, by Matthew Kisner. [REVIEW]Eugene Marshall - 2012 - Mind 121 (484):1085-1088.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Beyond Personal Feelings and Collective Emotions: Toward a Theory of Social Affect.Robert Seyfert - 2012 - Theory, Culture and Society 29 (6):27-46.
    In the Sociology of Emotion and Affect Studies, affects are usually regarded as an aspect of human beings alone, or of impersonal or collective atmospheres. However, feelings and emotions are only specific cases of affectivity that require subjective inner selves, while the concept of ‘atmospheres’ fails to explain the singularity of each individual case. This article develops a theory of social affect that does not reduce affect to either personal feelings or collective emotions. First, I use a Spinozist understanding of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  13. Animal Affects: Spinoza and the Frontiers of the Human.Hasana Sharp - 2011 - Journal for Critical Animal Studies 9 (1-2):48-68.
    Like any broad narrative about the history of ideas, this one involves a number of simplifications. My hope is that by taking a closer look Spinoza's notorious remarks on animals, we can understand better why it becomes especially urgent in this period as well as our own for philosophers to emphasize a distinction between human and nonhuman animals. In diagnosing the concerns that give rise to the desire to dismiss the independent purposes of animals, we may come to focus on (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  14. Spinoza on the Problem of Akrasia.Eugene Marshall - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):41-59.
    : Two common ways of explaining akrasia will be presented, one which focuses on strength of desire and the other which focuses on action issuing from practical judgment. Though each is intuitive in a certain way, they both fail as explanations of the most interesting cases of akrasia. Spinoza 's own thoughts on bondage and the affects follow, from which a Spinozist explanation of akrasia is constructed. This account is based in Spinoza 's mechanistic psychology of cognitive affects. Because Spinoza (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  15. The Power of Reason in Spinoza.Martin Lin - 2009 - In Olli Koistinen (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza's Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  16. Spinoza's Cognitive Affects and Their Feel.Eugene Marshall - 2008 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16 (1):1 – 23.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  17. Spinoza's Account of Akrasia.Martin Lin - 2006 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (3):395-414.
    : Perhaps the central problem which preoccupies Spinoza as a moral philosopher is the conflict between reason and passion. He belongs to a long tradition that sees the key to happiness and virtue as mastery and control by reason over the passions. This mastery, however, is hard won, as the passions often overwhelm its power and subvert its rule. When reason succumbs to passion, we act against our better judgment. Such action is often termed 'akratic'. Many commentators have complained that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations