Self-reference and the divorce between meaning and truth

Logic and Logical Philosophy 22 (4):445-452 (2013)
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Abstract
This paper argues that a certain type of self-referential sentence falsifies the widespread assumption that a declarative sentence's meaning is identical to its truth condition. It then argues that this problem cannot be assimilated to certain other problems that the assumption in question is independently known to face.
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First archival date: 2015-11-21
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2013-10-05

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