Results for 'self-reference'

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  1. Self-Reference, Phenomenology, and Philosophy of Science.Steven James Bartlett - 1980 - Methodology and Science: Interdisciplinary Journal for the Empirical Study of the Foundations of Science and Their Methodology 13 (3):143-167.
    The paper begins by acknowledging that weakened systematic precision in phenomenology has made its application in philosophy of science obscure and ineffective. The defining aspirations of early transcendental phenomenology are, however, believed to be important ones. A path is therefore explored that attempts to show how certain recent developments in the logic of self-reference fulfill in a clear and more rigorous fashion in the context of philosophy of science certain of the early hopes of phenomenologists. The resulting dual (...)
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  2. Self-Reference and the Languages of Arithmetic.Richard Heck - 2007 - Philosophia Mathematica 15 (1):1-29.
    I here investigate the sense in which diagonalization allows one to construct sentences that are self-referential. Truly self-referential sentences cannot be constructed in the standard language of arithmetic: There is a simple theory of truth that is intuitively inconsistent but is consistent with Peano arithmetic, as standardly formulated. True self-reference is possible only if we expand the language to include function-symbols for all primitive recursive functions. This language is therefore the natural setting for investigations of (...)-reference. (shrink)
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  3. Paradox Without Self-Reference.Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):251.
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  4. Varieties of Self-Reference.Steven James Bartlett - 1987 - In Steven James Bartlett & Peter Suber (eds.), Self-reference: Reflections on Reflexivity. Dordrecht, Holland: Martinus Nijhoff; now published by Springer Science. pp. 5-28.
    This is the introduction to Self-reference: Reflections on Reflexivity, edited by Steven James Bartlett and Peter Suber. The introduction identifies and describes a wide range of varieties of self-reference, some which have become important topics of investigation in philosophy, and others which are of significance in other disciplines. /// The anthology is the first published collection of essays to give a sense of depth and breadth of current work on this fascinating and important set of issues. (...)
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  5. Self-Reference and Chaos in Fuzzy Logic.Patrick Grim - 1993 - IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems 1:237-253.
    The purpose of this paper is to open for investigation a range of phenomena familiar from dynamical systems or chaos theory which appear in a simple fuzzy logic with the introduction of self-reference. Within that logic, self-referential sentences exhibit properties of fixed point attractors, fixed point repellers, and full chaos on the [0, 1] interval. Strange attractors and fractals appear in two dimensions in the graphing of pairs of mutually referential sentences and appear in three dimensions in (...)
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  6. Self-Reference, Reality Principles, Marxism, and Social Transformations in the Postmodern Era.Andras Balazs - 2010 - World Futures 66 (1):53-64.
    Three distinct turning points (“bottleneck breakings”) in universal evolution are discussed at some length in terms of “self-reference” and (corresponding) “Reality Principles.” The first (origin and evolution of animate Nature) and second (human consciousness) are shown to necessarily precede a third one, that of Marxist philosophy. It is pointed out that while the previous two could occupy a natural (so in a sense neutral) place as parts of human science, the self-reference of Marxism, as a _social_ (...)
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  7. Self-Reference and the Divorce Between Meaning and Truth.Savas L. Tsohatzidis - 2013 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 22 (4):445-452.
    This paper argues that a certain type of self-referential sentence falsifies the widespread assumption that a declarative sentence's meaning is identical to its truth condition. It then argues that this problem cannot be assimilated to certain other problems that the assumption in question is independently known to face.
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  8. Self-Reference Self-Explained.Achille C. Varzi - 2004 - PhiNews 6:36–39.
    A dialogue among statements that try to explain to each other the mechanisms and peculiarities of self-referential assertions and, particularly, of their context-dependence.
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  9. Reflexivity: A Source-Book in Self-Reference.Steven James Bartlett (ed.) - 1992 - Distributors for the U.S. And Canada, Elsevier Science Pub. Co..
    From the Editor’s Introduction: "The Internal Limitations of Human Understanding." We carry, unavoidably, the limits of our understanding with us. We are perpetually confined within the horizons of our conceptual structure. When this structure grows or expands, the breadth of our comprehensions enlarges, but we are forever barred from the wished-for glimpse beyond its boundaries, no matter how hard we try, no matter how much credence we invest in the substance of our learning and mist of speculation. -/- The limitations (...)
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  10.  34
    Language and the Self-Reference Paradox.Julio Michael Stern - 2007 - Cybernetics and Human Knowing 14 (4):71-92.
    Heinz Von Forester characterizes the objects “known” by an autopoietic system as eigen-solutions, that is, as discrete, separable, stable and composable states of the interaction of the system with its environment. Previous articles have presented the FBST, Full Bayesian Significance Test, as a mathematical formalism specifically designed to access the support for sharp statistical hypotheses, and have shown that these hypotheses correspond, from a constructivist perspective, to systemic eigen-solutions in the practice of science. In this article several issues related to (...)
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  11. Self-Reference and Logical Memory in Hegel's Theory of the Concept.Elisa Magrì - 2011 - Revista Eletrônica Estudos Hegelianos 1 (15):129-143.
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  12. Self-Reference and Gödel's Theorem: A Husserlian Analysis. [REVIEW]Albert Johnstone - 2003 - Husserl Studies 19 (2):131-151.
    A Husserlian phenomenological approach to logic treats concepts in terms of their experiential meaning rather than in terms of reference, sets of individuals, and sentences. The present article applies such an approach in turn to the reasoning operative in various paradoxes: the simple Liar, the complex Liar paradoxes, the Grelling-type paradoxes, and Gödel’s Theorem. It finds that in each case a meaningless statement, one generated by circular definition, is treated as if were meaningful, and consequently as either true or (...)
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  13.  93
    Formalizing Self-Reference Paradox Using Predicate Logic.Pete Olcott - manuscript
    We begin with the hypothetical assumption that Tarski’s 1933 formula ∀ True(x) φ(x) has been defined such that ∀x Tarski:True(x) ↔ Boolean-True. On the basis of this logical premise we formalize the Truth Teller Paradox: "This sentence is true." showing syntactically how self-reference paradox is semantically ungrounded.
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  14. Paradigms and Self-Reference: What is the Point of Asserting Paradoxical Sentences?Jakub Mácha - 2020 - In Shyam Wuppuluri & Newton da Costa (eds.), Wittgensteinian (adj.): Looking at the World from the Viewpoint of Wittgenstein's Philosophy. Cham, Švýcarsko: pp. 123-134.
    A paradox, according to Wittgenstein, is something surprising that is taken out of its context. Thus, one way of dealing with paradoxical sentences is to imagine the missing context of use. Wittgenstein formulates what I call the paradigm paradox: ‘one sentence can never describe the paradigm in another, unless it ceases to be a paradigm.’ (PG, p.346) There are several instances of this paradox scattered throughout Wittgenstein’s writings. I argue that this paradox is structurally equivalent to Russell’s paradox. The above (...)
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  15. Self-Conscious Self-Reference: An Approach Based on Agent's Knowledge (DPhil Manuscript).Anne Newstead - 2004 - Dissertation, Oxford University
    This thesis proposes that an account of first-person reference and first-person thinking requires an account of practical knowledge. At a minimum, first-person reference requires at least a capacity for knowledge of the intentional act of reference. More typically, first-person reasoning requires deliberation and the ability to draw inferences while entertaining different 'I' thoughts. Other accounts of first-person reference--such as the perceptual account and the rule-based account--are criticized as inadequate. An account of practical knowledge is provided by (...)
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  16.  86
    Causal Overlap and Self-Reference: A Brief Summary.Vitor Silva Tschoepke - manuscript
    The purpose of this text is to present a summary of the theory of self-reference as a result of the superposition of the causal history of a system. Self-reference is discussed here as an effect of the association between memory and causality. When considering the eventual situation of a physical system, different previous alternatives can take it to the same state. The means that constituted it are not intrinsic to it, there are no elements in it (...)
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  17. “I” Who? A New Look at Peirce’s Theory of Indexical Self-Reference.Marco Stango - 2015 - The Pluralist 10 (2):220-246.
    The aim of this article is to address the problem of what is usually called “self-consciousness” by studying Charles S. Peirce’s semeiotic treatment of self-referential statements. Peirce believes that an adequate study of the mind requires “to reduce all mental action,” including “self-consciousness,” “to the formula of valid reasoning” and its semeiotic nature. While Peirce makes frequent use of the notion of “consciousness,” he is at the same time distant from the understanding of the “conscious mind” that (...)
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  18.  58
    Prolog Detects Pathological Self Reference in the Gödel Sentence.P. Olcott - manuscript
    This sentence G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G) and its negation G ↔ ~(F ⊢ ¬G) are shown to meet the conventional definition of incompleteness: Incomplete(T) ↔ ∃φ ((T ⊬ φ) ∧ (T ⊬ ¬φ)). They meet conventional definition of incompleteness because neither the sentence nor its negation is provable in F (or any other formal system). -- .
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  19. Formalizing the Logical (Self-Reference) Error of the Liar Paradox.Pete Olcott - manuscript
    This paper decomposes the Liar Paradox into its semantic atoms using Meaning Postulates (1952) provided by Rudolf Carnap. Formalizing truth values of propositions as Boolean properties of these propositions is a key new insight. This new insight divides the translation of a declarative sentence into its equivalent mathematical proposition into three separate steps. When each of these steps are separately examined the logical error of the Liar Paradox is unequivocally shown.
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  20. Self, Belonging, and Conscious Experience: A Critique of Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness.Timothy Lane - 2015 - In Rocco Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed consciousness: New essays on psychopathology and theories of consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 103-140.
    Subjectivity theories of consciousness take self-reference, somehow construed, as essential to having conscious experience. These theories differ with respect to how many levels they posit and to whether self-reference is conscious or not. But all treat self-referencing as a process that transpires at the personal level, rather than at the subpersonal level, the level of mechanism. -/- Working with conceptual resources afforded by pre-existing theories of consciousness that take self-reference to be essential, several (...)
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  21. The Self-Referential Aspect of Consciousness.Cosmin Visan - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research 8 (11):864-880.
    Following the phenomenology that is revealed by the emergent structure of consciousness, the path will lead to the acknowledgement of consciousness having a self-referential aspect. By following phenomenological clues, properties of self-reference will be revealed. The two most prominent properties of self-reference will be shown to be inclusion and transcendence that will be shown to be found everywhere in the phenomenology of consciousness. Also, self-reference will turn out to be unformalizable, this imposing limits (...)
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  22. Self-Made People.David Mark Kovacs - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1071-1099.
    The Problem of Overlappers is a puzzle about what makes it the case, and how we can know, that we have the parts we intuitively think we have. In this paper, I develop and motivate an overlooked solution to this puzzle. According to what I call the self-making view it is within our power to decide what we refer to with the personal pronoun ‘I’, so the truth of most of our beliefs about our parts is ensured by the (...)
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  23. The Self and its Brain.Stan Klein - 2012 - Social Cognition 30 (4):474-518.
    In this paper I argue that much of the confusion and mystery surrounding the concept of "self" can be traced to a failure to appreciate the distinction between the self as a collection of diverse neural components that provide us with our beliefs, memories, desires, personality, emotions, etc (the epistemological self) and the self that is best conceived as subjective, unified awareness, a point of view in the first person (ontological self). While the former can, (...)
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  24. Diachronic Self-Making.David Mark Kovacs - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):349-362.
    This paper develops the Diachronic Self-Making View, the view that we are the non-accidentally best candidate referents of our ‘I’-beliefs. A formulation and defence of DSV is followed by an overview of its treatment of familiar puzzle cases about personal identity. The rest of the paper focuses on a challenge to DSV, the Puzzle of Inconstant ‘I’-beliefs: the view appears to force on us inconsistent verdicts about personal identity in cases that we would naturally describe as changes in one’s (...)
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  25.  92
    Self-Measure and Self-Moderation in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre.Michael Baur - 2001 - In Daniel Breazeale & Tom Rockmore (eds.), New Studies in Fichte’s Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre. Amherst, NY, USA: pp. 81-102.
    In the opening chapter of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke explains that the self-understanding or self-measure of the human mind includes an account of the mind’s limits, and so the mind’s self-understanding can provide adequate grounds for intellectual self-moderation or self-control: “If we can find out, how far the Understanding can extend its view; how far it has Faculties to attain Certainty; and in what Cases it can only judge and guess, we may (...)
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  26. Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument - Book Review. [REVIEW]Steven James Bartlett - 1979 - Review of Metaphysics (4):738-740.
    A book review of _Free Choice: A Self-referential Argument_ by J. M. Boyle, Jr., G. Grisez, and O. Tollefsen. The review concerns the pragmatical self-referential argument employed in the book, and points to the fact that the argument is itself self-referentially inconsistent, but on the level of metalogical self-reference.
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  27. Kant, the Transcendental Designation of I, and the Direct Reference Theory.Luca Forgione - 2019 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 34 (1): 31-49.
    The aim of this paper is to address the semantic issue of the nature of the representation I and of the transcendental designation, i.e., the self-referential apparatus involved in transcendental apperception. The I think, the bare or empty representation I, is the representational vehicle of the concept of transcendental subject; as such, it is a simple representation. The awareness of oneself as thinking is only expressed by the I: the intellectual representation which performs a referential function of the spontaneity (...)
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  28. Imposter Syndrome and Self-Deception.Stephen Gadsby - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-12.
    Many intelligent, capable, and successful individuals believe that their success is due to luck and fear that they will someday be exposed as imposters. A puzzling feature of this phenomenon, commonly referred to as imposter syndrome, is that these same individuals treat evidence in ways that maintain their false beliefs and debilitating fears: they ignore and misattribute evidence of their own abilities, while readily accepting evidence in favour of their inadequacy. I propose a novel account of imposter syndrome as an (...)
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  29. Dialectic as the 'Self-Fulfillment' of Logic.Dieter Wandschneider - 2010 - In Nektarios Limnatis (ed.), The Dimensions of Hegel's Dialectic. London, New York: Continuum. pp. 31–54.
    The scope of my considerations here is defined along two lines, which seem to me of essential relevance for a theory of dialectic. On the one hand, the form of negation that – as self-referring antinomical negation – gains a quasi-semantic expulsory force [Sprengkraft] and therewith a forwarding [weiterverweisenden] character; on the other hand, the notion that every logical category is defective insofar as the explicit meaning of a category does not express everything that is already implicitly presupposed for (...)
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  30. A Relativistic Theory of Phenomenological Constitution: A Self-Referential, Transcendental Approach to Conceptual Pathology.Steven James Bartlett - 1970 - Dissertation, Universite de Paris X (Paris-Nanterre) (France)
    A RELATIVISTIC THEORY OF PHENOMENOLOCICAL CONSTITUTION: A SELF-REFERENTIAL, TRANSCENDENTAL APPROACH TO CONCEPTUAL PATHOLOGY. (Vol. I: French; Vol. II: English) -/- Steven James Bartlett -/- Doctoral dissertation director: Paul Ricoeur, Université de Paris Other doctoral committee members: Jean Ladrière and Alphonse de Waehlens, Université Catholique de Louvain Defended publically at the Université Catholique de Louvain, January, 1971. -/- Universite de Paris X (France), 1971. 797pp. -/- The principal objective of the work is to construct an analytically precise methodology which can (...)
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  31. Locke on Being Self to My Self.Ruth Boeker - 2021 - In Patricia Kitcher (ed.), The Self: A History. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 118–144.
    John Locke accepts that every perception gives me immediate and intuitive knowledge of my own existence. However, this knowledge is limited to the present moment when I have the perception. If I want to understand the necessary and sufficient conditions of my continued existence over time, Locke argues that it is important to clarify what ‘I’ refers to. While we often do not distinguish the concept of a person from that of a human being in ordinary language, Locke emphasizes that (...)
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  32. Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. [REVIEW]Anne Newstead - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):5.
    This is a very short book review of a recent volume on the philosophy of Gareth Evans with special attention to work on first-person reference.
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  33. "The Paradox of Self-Consciousness" by José Luis Burmùdez. [REVIEW]Tim Crane - 2001 - Philosophical Review 1 (4):624.
    What José Luis Bermúdez calls the paradox of self-consciousness is essentially the conflict between two claims: (1) The capacity to use first-personal referential devices like “I” must be explained in terms of the capacity to think first-person thoughts. (2) The only way to explain the capacity for having a certain kind of thought is by explaining the capacity for the canonical linguistic expression of thoughts of that kind. (Bermúdez calls this the “Thought-Language Principle”.) The conflict between (1) and (2) (...)
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  34. The Self, Self-Knowledge, and a Flattened Path to Self-Improvement.Robert D. Rupert - manuscript
    This essay explores the connection between theories of the self and theories of self-knowledge, arguing (a) that empirical results strongly support a certain negative thesis about the self, a thesis about what the self isn’t, and (b) that a more promising account of the self makes available unorthodox – but likely apt – ways of characterizing self-knowledge. Regarding (a), I argue that the human self does not appear at a personal level the autonomous (...)
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  35. Qualitative Assessment of Self-Identity in Advanced Dementia.Sadhvi Batra, Jacqueline Sullivan, Beverly R. Williams & David S. Geldmacher - 2015 - Dementia: The International Journal of Social Research and Practice:1-19.
    This study aimed to understand the preserved elements of self-identity in persons with moderate to severe dementia attributable to Alzheimer’s disease. A semi-structured interview was developed to explore the narrative self among residents with dementia in a residential care facility and residents without dementia in an independent living setting. The interviews were transcribed verbatim from audio recordings and analyzed for common themes, while being sensitive to possible differences between the groups. The participants with dementia showed evidence of (...)-reference even though losses in explicit memory were evident. The most noticeable difference between the two groups was time frame reference. Nonetheless, all participants showed understanding of their role in relationships and exhibited concrete preferences. Our findings suggest that memory loss and other cognitive deficits associated with moderate to severe dementia do not necessarily lead to a loss of “self.”. (shrink)
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  36. The Trajectory of Self.Timothy Lane, Niall W. Duncan, Tony Cheng & Georg Northoff - 2016 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 20 (7):481-482.
    In a recent Opinion article, Sui and Humphreys [1] argue that experimental findings suggest self is ‘special’, in that self-reference serves a binding function within human cognitive economy. Contrasting their view with other functionalist positions, chiefly Dennett's [2], they deny that self is a convenient fiction and adduce findings to show that a ‘core self representation’ serves as an ‘integrative glue’ helping to bind distinct types of information as well as distinct stages of psycho- logical (...)
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  37. Wholistic Reference, Truth-Values, Universes of Discourse, and Formal Ontology: Tréplica to Oswaldo Chateaubriand.John Corcoran - 2005 - Manuscrito 28 (1):143-167.
    ABSTRACT: In its strongest unqualified form, the principle of wholistic reference is that in any given discourse, each proposition refers to the whole universe of that discourse, regardless of how limited the referents of its non-logical or content terms. According to this principle every proposition of number theory, even an equation such as "5 + 7 = 12", refers not only to the individual numbers that it happens to mention but to the whole universe of numbers. This principle, its (...)
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  38. Racism as Self-Love.Grant Joseph Silva - 2019 - Radical Philosophy Review 22 (1):85-112.
    In the United States today, much interpersonal racism is driven by corrupt forms of self-preservation. Drawing from Jean- Jacques Rousseau, I refer to this as self-love racism. The byproduct of socially-induced racial anxieties and perceived threats to one’s physical or social wellbeing, self-love racism is the protective attachment to the racialized dimensions of one’s social status, wealth, privilege, and/or identity. Examples include police officer related shootings of unarmed Black Americans, anti-immigrant sentiment, and the resurgence of unabashed white (...)
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  39. Phenomenal Consciousness with Infallible Self-Representation.Chad Kidd - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (3):361-383.
    In this paper, I argue against the claim recently defended by Josh Weisberg that a certain version of the self-representational approach to phenomenal consciousness cannot avoid a set of problems that have plagued higher-order approaches. These problems arise specifically for theories that allow for higher-order misrepresentation or—in the domain of self-representational theories—self-misrepresentation. In response to Weisberg, I articulate a self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness according to which it is contingently impossible for self-representations tokened in the (...)
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  40. Handedness, Self-Models and Embodied Cognitive Content.Holger Lyre - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):529–538.
    The paper presents and discusses the “which-is-which content of handedness,” the meaning of left as left and right as right, as a possible candidate for the idea of a genuine embodied cognitive content. After showing that the Ozma barrier, the non-transferability of the meaning of left and right, provides a kind of proof of the non-descriptive, indexical nature of the which-is-which content of handedness, arguments are presented which suggest that the classical representationalist account of cognition faces a perplexing problem of (...)
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  41. Consistent Belief in a Good True Self in Misanthropes and Three Interdependent Cultures.Julian De Freitas, Hagop Sarkissian, George E. Newman, Igor Grossmann, Felipe De Brigard, Andres Luco & Joshua Knobe - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (S1):134-160.
    People sometimes explain behavior by appealing to an essentialist concept of the self, often referred to as the true self. Existing studies suggest that people tend to believe that the true self is morally virtuous; that is deep inside, every person is motivated to behave in morally good ways. Is this belief particular to individuals with optimistic beliefs or people from Western cultures, or does it reflect a widely held cognitive bias in how people understand the (...)? To address this question, we tested the good true self theory against two potential boundary conditions that are known to elicit different beliefs about the self as a whole. Study 1 tested whether individual differences in misanthropy—the tendency to view humans negatively—predict beliefs about the good true self in an American sample. The results indicate a consistent belief in a good true self, even among individuals who have an explicitly pessimistic view of others. Study 2 compared true self-attributions across cultural groups, by comparing samples from an independent country and a diverse set of interdependent countries. Results indicated that the direction and magnitude of the effect are comparable across all groups we tested. The belief in a good true self appears robust across groups varying in cultural orientation or misanthropy, suggesting a consistent psychological tendency to view the true self as morally good. (shrink)
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  42. Consciousness as Recursive, Spatiotemporal Self Location.Frederic Peters - 2010 - Psychological Research.
    At the phenomenal level, consciousness can be described as a singular, unified field of recursive self-awareness, consistently coherent in a particualr way; that of a subject located both spatially and temporally in an egocentrically-extended domain, such that conscious self-awareness is explicitly characterized by I-ness, now-ness and here-ness. The psychological mechanism underwriting this spatiotemporal self-locatedness and its recursive processing style involves an evolutionary elaboration of the basic orientative reference frame which consistently structures ongoing spatiotemporal self-location computations (...)
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  43. The Trans-Species Core SELF: The Emergence of Active Cultural and Neuro-Ecological Agents Through Self-Related Processing Within Subcortical-Cortical Midline Networks.Jaak Panksepp & Georg Northoff - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):193–215.
    The nature of “the self” has been one of the central problems in philosophy and more recently in neuroscience. This raises various questions: Can we attribute a self to animals? Do animals and humans share certain aspects of their core selves, yielding a trans-species concept of self? What are the neural processes that underlie a possible trans-species concept of self? What are the developmental aspects and do they result in various levels of self-representation? Drawing on (...)
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  44. Self-Referential Theories.Samuel A. Alexander - 2020 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 85 (4):1687-1716.
    We study the structure of families of theories in the language of arithmetic extended to allow these families to refer to one another and to themselves. If a theory contains schemata expressing its own truth and expressing a specific Turing index for itself, and contains some other mild axioms, then that theory is untrue. We exhibit some families of true self-referential theories that barely avoid this forbidden pattern.
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  45. The Structure of I-Thoughts. Kant and Wittgenstein on the Genesis of Cartesian Self.Luca Forgione - 2019 - Paradigmi. Rivista di Critica Filosofica 3:535-548.
    The analysis of the structure of the I-thoughts is intertwined with several epistemic and metaphysical questions. The aim of this paper is to highlight that the absence of an identification component does not imply that the “I" doesn’t perform a referential function, nor that it necessarily involves a specific metaphysical thesis on the nature of the self-conscious subject. Particularly, as far as the Cartesian illusion concerning the thinking subject’s immaterial nature is concerned, Kant and Wittgenstein seem to share the (...)
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  46. Kant and the Problem of Self-Knowledge.Luca Forgione - 2018 - New York, Stati Uniti: Routledge.
    This book addresses the problem of self-knowledge in Kant’s philosophy. As Kant writes in his major works of the critical period, it is due to the simple and empty representation ‘I think’ that the subject’s capacity for self-consciousness enables the subject to represent its own mental dimension. This book articulates Kant’s theory of self-knowledge on the basis of the following three philosophical problems: 1) a semantic problem regarding the type of reference of the representation ‘I’; 2) (...)
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  47. Kant and the Problem of Self-Identification.Luca Forgione - 2015 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (2):178-198.
    Ever since Strawson’s The Bounds of Sense, the transcendental apperception device has become a theoretical reference point to shed light on the criterionless selfascription form of mental states, reformulating a contemporary theoretical place tackled for the first time in explicit terms by Wittgenstein’s Blue Book. By investigating thoroughly some elements of the critical system the issue of the identification of the transcendental subject with reference to the I think will be singled out. In this respect, the debate presents (...)
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  48. Self-Transcendent Experience: Narrative & Analysis.Gregory Nixon (ed.) - 2011 - QuantumDream.
    How one transcends the self depends on the self that experiences it. Is it instigated or sought, does it happen by accident, or by an act of Grace? Is it common or rare? Is it brought on by the ingestion of psychedelic agents or by meditation or by being overcome by fear or merely by caring more about the welfare of others than oneself? Is it transcendence to experience a shift of perspective or dissolution of the self? (...)
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  49. The Idea of a Metalogic of Reference.Steven James Bartlett - 1976 - Methodology and Science: Interdisciplinary Journal for the Empirical Study of the Foundations of Science and Their Methodology 9 (3):85-92.
    This paper sought to state in a concise and comparatively informal, unsystematic, and more accessible form the more technical approach the author developed during a research fellowship in 1974-75 at the Max-Planck-Institut in Starnberg, Germany. ●●●●● The ideas presented in this paper are more fully developed in later publications by the author which are listed in the two-page addendum to this paper. ●●●●● UPDATED NOTE TO THE READER - December, 2021 ●●●●● Readers will find a more fully developed position than (...)
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  50. Nishida, Agency, and the 'Self-Contradictory' Body.Joel W. Krueger - 2008 - Asian Philosophy 18 (3):213 – 229.
    In this essay, I investigate Kitarō Nishida's characterization of what he refers to as the 'self-contradictory' body. First, I clarify the conceptual relation between the self-contradictory body and Nishida's notion of 'acting-intuition'. I next look at Nishida's analysis of acting-intuition and the self-contradictory body as it pertains to our personal, sensorimotor engagement with the world and things in it, as well as to our bodily immersion within the intersubjective and social world. Along the way, I argue that (...)
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