Constitutive arguments

Philosophy Compass 5 (8):656-666 (2010)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Can the question "Why do what morality requires?" be answered in such a way that anyone regardless of their desires or interests has reason to be moral? One strategy for answering this question appeals to constitutive arguments. In general, constitutive arguments attempt to establish the normativity of rational requirements by pointing out that we are already committed to them insofar as we are believers or agents. This study is concerned with the general prospects for such arguments. It starts by explaining the general constitutive argument strategy, followed by an examination of constitutive arguments that have been given regarding theoretical reason and the instrumental principle in practical reason, and concluding with a discussion of some challenges to constitutive arguments in moral philosophy and some possible responses to these challenges.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
TUBCA
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
The Sources of Normativity.Korsgaard, Christine M.
Why Be Rational?Kolodny, Niko
Doxastic Deliberation.Shah, Nishi & David Velleman, J.

View all 25 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2010-07-22

Total downloads
205 ( #12,591 of 37,117 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
18 ( #18,316 of 37,117 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.