Two Kinds of Value Pluralism

Utilitas 28 (3):333-346 (2016)
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Abstract
I argue that there are two distinct views called ‘value pluralism’ in contemporary axiology, but that these positions have not been properly distinguished. The first kind of pluralism, weak pluralism, is the view philosophers have in mind when they say that there are many things that are valuable. It is also the kind of pluralism that philosophers like Moore, Brentano and Chisholm were interested in. The second kind of pluralism, strong pluralism, is the view philosophers have in mind when they say there are many values, or many kinds of value. It is also the kind of pluralism that philosophers like Stocker, Kekes and Nussbaum have advanced. I separate and elucidate these views, and show how the distinction between them affects the contemporary debate about value pluralism.
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Archival date: 2019-03-09
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References found in this work BETA
Vagueness.Torrago, Loretta & Williamson, Timothy
The Right and the Good.Ross, W. D. & Joseph, H. W. B.
Vagueness.Russell, Bertrand
Value Pluralism.Mason, Elinor

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Citations of this work BETA
Value Pluralism.Mason, Elinor
Intrinsic Vs. Extrinsic Value.Zimmerman, Michael J.

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2016-01-26

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