Two Kinds of Value Pluralism

Utilitas 28 (3):333-346 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
I argue that there are two distinct views called ‘value pluralism’ in contemporary axiology, but that these positions have not been properly distinguished. The first kind of pluralism, weak pluralism, is the view philosophers have in mind when they say that there are many things that are valuable. It is also the kind of pluralism that philosophers like Moore, Brentano and Chisholm were interested in. The second kind of pluralism, strong pluralism, is the view philosophers have in mind when they say there are many values, or many kinds of value. It is also the kind of pluralism that philosophers like Stocker, Kekes and Nussbaum have advanced. I separate and elucidate these views, and show how the distinction between them affects the contemporary debate about value pluralism.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
TUCTKO-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-03-09
View other versions
Added to PP index
2016-01-26

Total views
190 ( #24,426 of 53,571 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
36 ( #18,588 of 53,571 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.