Knowledge and suberogatory assertion

Philosophical Studies 167 (3):557-567 (2014)
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Abstract

I accomplish two things in this paper. First I expose some important limitations of the contemporary literature on the norms of assertion and in the process illuminate a host of new directions and forms that an account of assertional norms might take. Second I leverage those insights to suggest a new account of the relationship between knowledge and assertion, which arguably outperforms the standard knowledge account.

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John Turri
University of Waterloo

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