Revisiting norms of assertion
Cognition 177 (C):8-11 (2018)
Abstract
A principal conclusion supported by convergent evidence from cognitive science, life science, and philosophy is that knowledge is a central norm of assertion—that is, according to the rules of the practice, assertions should express knowledge. That view has recently been challenged with new experiments. This paper identifies a critical confound in the experiments. In the process, a new study is reported that provides additional support for the view that knowledge is a central norm of assertion.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1016/j.cognition.2018.03.023
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2018-04-01
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156 (#47,725)
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64 (#18,311)
2018-04-01
Downloads
156 (#47,725)
6 months
64 (#18,311)
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