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Stumbling in Nozick’s Tracks
Logos and Episteme 3 (2):291-293 (2012)
Abstract
Rachael Briggs and Daniel Nolan have recently proposed an improved version of Nozick’s tracking account of knowledge. I show that, despite its virtues, the new proposal suffers from three serious problems.Author's Profile
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Added to PP
2017-01-11
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276 (#57,867)
6 months
77 (#59,755)
2017-01-11
Downloads
276 (#57,867)
6 months
77 (#59,755)
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