Simulation Typology and Termination Risks

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Abstract
The goal of the article is to explore what is the most probable type of simulation in which humanity lives (if any) and how this affects simulation termination risks. We firstly explore the question of what kind of simulation in which humanity is most likely located based on pure theoretical reasoning. We suggest a new patch to the classical simulation argument, showing that we are likely simulated not by our own descendants, but by alien civilizations. Based on this, we provide classification of different possible simulations and we find that simpler, less expensive and one-person-centered simulations, resurrectional simulations, or simulations of the first artificial general intelligence’s (AGI’s) origin (singularity simulations) should dominate. Also, simulations which simulate the 21st century and global catastrophic risks are probable. We then explore whether the simulation could collapse or be terminated. Most simulations must be terminated after they model the singularity or after they model a global catastrophe before the singularity. Undeniably observed glitches, but not philosophical speculations could result in simulation termination. The simulation could collapse if it is overwhelmed by glitches. The Doomsday Argument in simulations implies termination soon. We conclude that all types of the most probable simulations except resurrectional simulations are prone to termination risks in a relatively short time frame of hundreds of years or less from now.
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TURSTA-9
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Archival date: 2019-05-16
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2019-05-16

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