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  1. Innocence Lost: Simulation Scenarios: Prospects and Consequences.Barry Francis Dainton - manuscript
    Those who believe suitably programmed computers could enjoy conscious experience of the sort we enjoy must accept the possibility that their own experience is being generated as part of a computerized simulation. It would be a mistake to dismiss this is just one more radical sceptical possibility: for as Bostrom has recently noted, if advances in computer technology were to continue at close to present rates, there would be a strong probability that we are each living in a computer simulation. (...)
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  2. Relativity in a Planck-Level Black-Hole Universe Simulation, a Simulation Hypothesis.Malcolm Macleod - manuscript
    The Simulation Hypothesis proposes that all of reality is in fact an artificial simulation, analogous to a computer simulation, and as such our reality is an illusion. It is predicated upon the assumption that enormous amounts of computing power are available. In this article I outline a method with low computational cost for reproducing relativistic mass, space and time at the Planck level. Virtual particles that oscillate between an electric wave-state and a mass point-state are mapped within an expanding black-hole (...)
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  3. Relativity and Gravity in a Planck-Level Black-Hole Universe Simulation.Malcolm J. Macleod - manuscript
    The Simulation Hypothesis proposes that all of reality is in fact an artificial simulation, analogous to a computer simulation, and as such our reality is an illusion. In this article, virtual particles are mapped within an incrementally (the simulation clock-rate) expanding in Planck units 4-axis hyper-sphere array (the virtual universe). These particles oscillate between an electric wave-state and a Planck mass Planck time point-state, where only the point-state has defined co-ordinates within the hyper-sphere. The velocity of expansion is a constant (...)
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  4. The Fine-Tuning Argument and the Simulation Hypothesis.Moti Mizrahi - 2017 - Think 16 (47):93-102.
    In this paper, I propose that, in addition to the multiverse hypothesis, which is commonly taken to be an alternative explanation for fine-tuning, other than the design hypothesis, the simulation hypothesis is another explanation for fine-tuning. I then argue that the simulation hypothesis undercuts the alleged evidential connection between ‘designer’ and ‘supernatural designer of immense power and knowledge’ in much the same way that the multiverse hypothesis undercuts the alleged evidential connection between ‘fine-tuning’ and ‘fine-tuner’ (or ‘designer’). If this is (...)
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  5. Correcting Errors in the Bostrom/Kulczycki Simulation Arguments.Wehr Robert Dustin - manuscript
    Both patched versions of the Bostrom/Kulczycki simulation argument contain serious objective errors, discovered while attempting to formalize them in predicate logic. The English glosses of both versions involve badly misleading meanings of vague magnitude terms, which their impressiveness benefits from. We fix the errors, prove optimal versions of the arguments, and argue that both are much less impressive than they originally appeared. Finally, we provide a guide for readers to evaluate the simulation argument for themselves, using well-justified settings of the (...)
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  6. The Simulated Universe.Brent Silby - 2009 - Philosophy Now 75 (75):28-30.
    This article explores the Simulated Universe argument with particular reference to Nick Bostrom’s formulation. After providing an exposition of the argument, I address two problems and conclude that we reject the possibility that we exist in a simulation.
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  7. Are You a Sim?Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):425–431.
    Nick Bostrom argues that if we accept some plausible assumptions about how the future will unfold, we should believe we are probably not humans. The argument appeals crucially to an indifference principle whose precise content is a little unclear. I set out four possible interpretations of the principle, none of which can be used to support Bostrom’s argument. On the first two interpretations the principle is false, on the third it does not entail the conclusion, and on the fourth it (...)
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