Anthropocentric Realism about Values

In Chenyang Li & Peimin Ni (eds.), Moral Cultivation and Confucian Character. Albany, NY, USA: State University of New York Press. pp. 65-96 (2014)
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Abstract
31 The choice of human goals cannot be completely subjective, because 32 there are some (even ones that motivate many humans) that are simply 33 unintelligible as ultimate goals. For example, wealth is rational as an 34 intermediate goal, a means to achieving some further end, but it is simply 35 unintelligible to suggest that wealth is an ultimate goal in itself. Second, 36 we have seen that some things are reasonable to pursue as aspects of 37 our ultimate goals (like prestige and pleasure), but they are conceptu- 38 ally dependent on some other goal to give them concrete form. In this 39 essay, I argue in favor of six candidates for ultimate goals
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