Do religious “beliefs” respond to evidence?

Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup1):52-72 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Some examples suggest that religious credences respond to evidence. Other examples suggest they are wildly unresponsive. So the examples taken together suggest there is a puzzle about whether descriptive religious attitudes respond to evidence or not. I argue for a solution to this puzzle according to which religious credences are characteristically not responsive to evidence; that is, they do not tend to be extinguished by contrary evidence. And when they appear to be responsive, it is because the agents with those credences are playing what I call The Evidence Game, which in fundamental ways resembles the games of make-believe described by Walton's theory of make-believe.
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
VANDRQ
Revision history
Archival date: 2016-08-24
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2016-08-24

Total views
147 ( #16,651 of 37,288 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
14 ( #22,006 of 37,288 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.