The Puzzle of Belief

Cognitive Science 47 (2):e13245 (2023)
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The notion of belief appears frequently in cognitive science. Yet it has resisted definition of the sort that could clarify inquiry. How then might a cognitive science of belief proceed? Here we propose a form of pluralism about believing. According to this view, there are importantly different ways to "believe" an idea. These distinct psychological kinds occur within a multi-dimensional property space, with different property clusters within that space constituting distinct varieties of believing. We propose that discovering such property clusters is empirically tractable, and that this approach can help sidestep merely verbal disputes about what constitutes “belief.”

Author Profiles

Neil Van Leeuwen
Georgia State University
Tania Lombrozo
University of California, Berkeley


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