Personas en el mundo: la perspectiva de la primera persona y el naturalismo

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In this paper we examine different answers to the question of what we are, focusing in particular on eliminative and reductivist proposals about persons or selves. We conclude that, as of today, dualism seems more reasonable than naturalism, if by naturalism we understand the thesis that psychological entities can be reduced or eliminated.
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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References found in this work BETA
The Astonishing Hypothesis.Crick, Francis & Clark, J.
The Ego Tunnel.Metzinger, Thomas
What Are We?Olson, Eric T.

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