Personas en el mundo: la perspectiva de la primera persona y el naturalismo

Análisis: Revista de Investigación Filosófica 1:161-180 (2014)
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In this paper we examine different answers to the question of what we are, focusing in particular on eliminative and reductivist proposals about persons or selves. We conclude that, as of today, dualism seems more reasonable than naturalism, if by naturalism we understand the thesis that psychological entities can be reduced or eliminated.

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Agustin Vicente
University of the Basque Country


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