Some Concerns Regarding Pritchard’s approach to Hinge Commitments

Sképsis (19):76-82 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
n the first part of the paper I will present Pritchard’s approach to Wittgenstein’s notion of hinge commitments, which is essential to his solution to the closure-based sceptical arguments. And, in the second par of the paper, I will raise some concerns that I have regarding Pritchard’s non-belief reading of the hinge commitments. In the third and final part, I make some concluding remarks regarding Pritchard’s overall strategy to solve the closure-based sceptical paradox.
Categories
PhilPapers/Archive ID
VIESCR
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-09-11
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-09-11

Total views
8 ( #53,656 of 52,662 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #45,858 of 52,662 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.