‘Reason’s Sympathy’ and its Foundations in Productive Imagination

Kantian Review 26 (3):455–474. (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This paper argues that Kant endorses a distinction between rational and natural sympathy, and it presents an interpretation of rational sympathy as a power of voluntarya posterioriproductive imagination. In rational sympathy we draw on the imagination’s voluntary powers (a) to subjectively unify the contents of intuition, in order to imaginatively put ourselves in others’ places, and (b) to associate imagined intuitional contents with the concepts others use to convey their feelings, in such a way that those contents prompt feelings in us that are like their feelings.

Author's Profile

Benjamin Vilhauer
City College of New York (CUNY)


Added to PP

266 (#52,261)

6 months
92 (#38,280)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?