Conjeturas sobre las nociones aristotélicas de “ciencia”, “género” y “entidad”, para una lectura ontológica de la Metafísica [Conjectures on Aristotelian notions "science", "genus», "entity", to ontological lecture of Metaphysics]

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Abstract
Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, not only tries to establish a relationship that is direct, coherent, inter-operational and "precise" between this science, its name as a science, and its object of study, but also begins an indignation that tries to set a science — materially adequate and formally correct — to study τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν. In order to complete this task, Aristotle does an in-focus strategy that consists on the diffusion of τὸ ὄν in its categories, that allows Aristotle the possibility of formulate a science ἐπιστήμη to study τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν at the same time that supports the diffusion of τὸ ὄν in the "different categories or supreme genres" of τὸ ὄν. Due to this argumentation, Aristotle distinguishes the ἐπιστήμη σοφία of any other type of knowledge: the former is fundamentally an enquiry "about the first causes (πρῶτα αἴτια) and the principles (ἀρχὰς)". With this conception in mind, Aristotle was able to characterize several related forms of the ἐπιστήμη σοφία which, as a whole, eventually allow him to establish a science of the principles and causes "maximally universal and referred to…everything real", and in consequence, to "that that is, as long as something is". In this work, I will try to reconstruct such arguments, and offer some observations and conjectures referred to these notions that plausibly incline the scale in favor of an ontological reading of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, in order to contribute to clarify the confusion that exists between the aim of the discipline with the justification to establish the existence of its own object.
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Archival date: 2016-09-26
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