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  1. Aristotle on Induction and First Principles.Marc Gasser-Wingate - 2016 - Philosophers' Imprint 16:1-20.
    Aristotle's cognitive ideal is a form of understanding that requires a sophisticated grasp of scientific first principles. At the end of the Analytics, Aristotle tells us that we learn these principles by induction. But on the whole, commentators have found this an implausible claim: induction seems far too basic a process to yield the sort of knowledge Aristotle's account requires. In this paper I argue that this criticism is misguided. I defend a broader reading of Aristotelian induction, on which there's (...)
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  2. Conhecimento e Opinião em Aristóteles (Segundos Analíticos I-33).Lucas Angioni - 2013 - In Marcelo Carvalho (ed.), Encontro Nacional Anpof: Filosofia Antiga e Medieval. Anpof. pp. 329-341.
    This chapter discusses the first part of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics A-33, 88b30-89a10. I claim that Aristotle is not concerned with an epistemological distinction between knowledge and belief in general. He is rather making a contrast between scientific knowledge (which is equivalent to explanation by the primarily appropriate cause) and some explanatory beliefs that falls short of capturing the primarily appropriate cause.
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  3. Conjeturas sobre las nociones aristotélicas de “ciencia”, “género” y “entidad”, para una lectura ontológica de la Metafísica [Conjectures on Aristotelian notions "science", "genus», "entity", to ontological lecture of Metaphysics].Paulo Vélez León - 2013 - Analysis. Documentos de Investigación 16 (3):1-11.
    Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, not only tries to establish a relationship that is direct, coherent, inter-operational and "precise" between this science, its name as a science, and its object of study, but also begins an indignation that tries to set a science — materially adequate and formally correct — to study τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν. In order to complete this task, Aristotle does an in-focus strategy that consists on the diffusion of τὸ ὄν in its categories, that allows Aristotle the (...)
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  4. Aristotle’s Prohibition Rule on Kind-Crossing and the Definition of Mathematics as a Science of Quantities.Paola Cantù - 2010 - Synthese 174 (2):225-235.
    The article evaluates the Domain Postulate of the Classical Model of Science and the related Aristotelian prohibition rule on kind-crossing as interpretative tools in the history of the development of mathematics into a general science of quantities. Special reference is made to Proclus’ commentary to Euclid’s first book of Elements , to the sixteenth century translations of Euclid’s work into Latin and to the works of Stevin, Wallis, Viète and Descartes. The prohibition rule on kind-crossing formulated by Aristotle in Posterior (...)
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  5. An Aristotelian Theory of Divine Illumination: Robert Grosseteste's Commentary on the Posterior Analytics.Christina Van Dyke - 2009 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (4):685-704.
    Two central accounts of human cognition emerge over the course of the Middle Ages: the theory of divine illumination and an Aristotelian theory centered on abstraction from sense data. Typically, these two accounts are seen as competing views of the origins of human knowledge; theories of divine illumination focus on God’s direct intervention in our epistemic lives, whereas Aristotelian theories generally claim that our knowledge derives primarily (or even entirely) from sense perception. In this paper, I address an early attempt (...)
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  6. Aristotle on Episteme and Nous: The Posterior Analytics.Murat Aydede - 1998 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):15-46.
    According to the standard and largely traditional interpretation, Aristotle’s conception of nous, at least as it occurs in the Posterior Analytics, is geared against a certain set of skeptical worries about the possibility of scientific knowledge, and ultimately of the knowledge of Aristotelian first principles. On this view, Aristotle introduces nous as an intuitive faculty that grasps the first principles once and for all as true in such a way that it does not leave any room for the skeptic to (...)
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