Kant on Moral Satisfaction

Kantian Review 22 (2):281-303 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
This paper gives an account of Kant’s concept of self-contentment (Selbstzufriedenheit), i.e. the satisfaction involved in the performance of moral action. This concept is vulnerable to an important objection: if moral action is satisfying, it might only ever be performed for the sake of this satisfaction. I explain Kant’s response to this objection and argue that it is superior to Francis Hutcheson’s response to a similar objection. I conclude by showing that two other notions of moral satisfaction in Kant’s moral philosophy, namely ‘sweet merit’ and the highest good, also avoid the objection.
Reprint years
2016, 2017
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-09-20
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
133 ( #41,265 of 65,651 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
16 ( #42,757 of 65,651 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.