Conceptual Schemes and Presuppositional Languages

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Abstract
The current discussions of conceptual schemes and related topics are misguided; for they are based on a tacit assumption that the difference between two schemes consists in the different distributions in truth-values. I argue that what should concern us, in the discussions of conceptual schemes and related issues, is not truth-values of assertions, but rather the truth-value-status of the sentences used to make the assertions. This is because the genuine conceptual innovation between alternative theories or languages does not lie in differences in determining truth-values of their sentences, but turns on whether these sentences have truth-values when considered within the context of a competing one. This new interpretation of the notion of conceptual schemes, which I refer to as presuppositional languages, is not only good in itself—for establishing the intelligibility and tenability of the notion—but quite beneficial in its effect on other related issues.
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2007, 2007 reprint
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WANCSA
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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References found in this work BETA
Truth and Method.Gadamer, H. G.
Language, Thought and Reality.Whorf, Benjamin Lee; Carroll, John B. & Chase, Stuart
Culture; A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions.Kroeber, A. L.; Kluckhohn, Clyde; Untereiner, Wayne & Meyer, Alfred G.

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2011-12-02

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