Die Inkonsistenz empiristischer Argumentation im Zusammenhang mit dem Problem der Naturgesetzlichkeit

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Summary The well-known empiristical apories of the law of nature prevent until this day an adequate philosophical interpretation of empirical science. Clarification can only be expected through an immanent refutation of the empiristical point of view. In this sense it is proved in this paper that Hume's argumentation, paradigmatic for modern empirism, is not just one-sided, but simply inconsistent: Anyone who claimes experience to be the basis of all knowledge (as the empirist does), and, due to this, denies that the lawlike character of nature can be substantiated, has, in fact, always presupposed the lawfullness of nature, i. e. has assumed the ontology of a nature lawful in itself. If this lawfullness is, more closely, understood as dependency on conditions, then the functional character of the laws of nature is involved with the consequence that verification is not only to be understood as a mere repetition of instances of the law but as a verification of the conditional texture defined in it. Furthermore does the functionality of the law of nature also include a statement on its invariance (against certain transformations). This throws a new light on the problem of induction. In this context it cannot be surprising that the notorious neglect of the functional aspect in the context of modern empirism has led to fundamental problems with the concept of the law of nature.
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Archival date: 2020-07-30
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