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  1. added 2020-09-07
    What Accounts for the Paradox in Goodman's Paradox. The Neglect of the Functional Character of Natural Laws as the Reason for the Paradox.Dieter Wandschneider - 2000 - In Peres, Constanze/ Greimann, Dirk (ed. 2000) Wahrheit – Sein – Struktur. Auseinandersetzungen mit Metaphysik. Hildesheim, Zürich, New York: Olms 2000, 231–245. Hildesheim, Zürich, New York: pp. 231–245.
    Essential for the concept of the law of nature is not only spatio-temporal universality, but also functionality in the sense of the dependency on physical conditions of natural entities. In the following it is explained in detail that just the neglect of this functional property is to be understood as the real reason for the occurrence of the Goodman paradox – with the consequence, that the behavior of things seems to be completely at the mercy of change of unique unrepeatable (...)
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  2. added 2020-09-07
    Das Paradoxe in Goodmans Paradox. Die Vernachlässigung des Funktionscharakters von Naturgesetzen als Grund der Paradoxie.Dieter Wandschneider - 2000 - In Wahrheit – Sein – Struktur. Auseinandersetzungen mit Metaphysik. Hildesheim, Zürich, New York: pp. 231–245.
    Essential for the concept of the law of nature is not only spatio-temporal universality, but also functionality in the sense of the dependency on physical conditions of natural entities. In the following it is explained in detail that just the neglect of this functional property is to be understood as the real reason for the occurrence of the Goodman paradox. As a consequence, the behavior of things seems to be completely at the mercy of the temporal change of unique absolute (...)
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  3. added 2020-03-08
    Goodman's Paradox, Hume's Problem, Goodman-Kripke Paradox: Three Different Issues.Beppe Brivec - manuscript
    ABSTRACT This paper reports (in section 1 “Introduction”) some quotes from Nelson Goodman which clarify that, contrary to a common misunderstanding, Goodman always denied that “grue” requires temporal information and “green” does not require temporal information; and, more in general, that Goodman always denied that grue-like predicates require additional information compared to what green-like predicates require. One of the quotations is the following, taken from the first page of the Foreword to chapter 8 “Induction” of the Goodman’s book “Problems and (...)
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  4. added 2019-12-18
    O velho e novo problema da indução.Eros Carvalho - manuscript
    Neste texto inrodutório, apresento brevemente o que normalmente se entende pelo velho problema da indução e, em seguida, apresento um pouco mais detidamente, acentuando as diferenças e semelhanças, o novo enigma da indução.
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  5. added 2019-12-07
    Goodman’s Paradox, Hume’s Problem, Goodman-Kripke Paradox: Three Different Issues.Beppe Brivec - manuscript
    On page 14 of "Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences" (section 4 of chapter 1) by Nelson Goodman and Catherine Z. Elgin is written: “Since ‘blue’ and ‘green’ are interdefinable with ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’, the question of which pair is basic and which pair derived is entirely a question of which pair we start with”. This paper points out that an example of interdefinability is also that one about the predicate “grueb”, which is a predicate that applies to (...)
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  6. added 2019-07-08
    Goodman e o projeto de uma definição construtiva de “indução válida”.Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2018 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 22 (3):439-460.
    In Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Nelson Goodman claims that the problem of justifying induction is not something over and above the problem of describing valid induction. Such claim, besides suggesting his commitment to the collapse of the distinction between the context of description and the context of justification, seems to open the possibility that the new riddle of induction could be addressed empirically. Discoveries about psychological preferences for projecting certain classes of objects could function as a criterion for determining which (...)
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  7. added 2019-01-06
    A Comprehensive Theory of Induction and Abstraction, Part II.Cael Hasse - manuscript
    This is part II in a series of papers outlining Abstraction Theory, a theory that I propose provides a solution to the characterisation or epistemological problem of induction. Logic is built from first principles severed from language such that there is one universal logic independent of specific logical languages. A theory of (non-linguistic) meaning is developed which provides the basis for the dissolution of the `grue' problem and problems of the non-uniqueness of probabilities in inductive logics. The problem of counterfactual (...)
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  8. added 2018-11-28
    Goodman e o equilíbrio reflexivo.Eros Moreira Carvalho - 2013 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 58 (3):467-481.
    Goodman sustentou que o ajuste mútuo entre inferências indutivas particulares e princípios indutivos constitui a única justificação necessária para ambos. Porém, a sua caracterização desse ajuste, posteriormente denominado de “equilíbrio reflexivo”, foi superficial. Isso levantou dúvida sobre a sua adequação. Neste artigo, argumento que o equilíbrio reflexivo, corretamente caracterizado, fornece a única justificação necessária e a melhor que podemos dar para a prática indutiva.
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  9. added 2016-10-22
    El Nuevo Enigma de la Inducción y Los Términos de Clase Natural.Ignacio Avila - 2002 - Critica 34 (100):55-85.
    En este ensayo intento mostrar el estrecho vínculo entre el asunto de la fijación de la extensión de los términos de clase natural y el problema de la proyectabilidad puesto de relieve por Goodman con su nuevo enigma de la inducción. Por un lado argumento que el nuevo enigma de la inducción pone de manifiesto la presencia de un elemento fregeano en la teoría de la referencia directa de Putnam y, por el otro, señalo la necesidad de que una respuesta (...)
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  10. added 2016-09-29
    A Comprehensive Theory of Induction and Abstraction, Part I.Cael L. Hasse - manuscript
    I present a solution to the epistemological or characterisation problem of induction. In part I, Bayesian Confirmation Theory (BCT) is discussed as a good contender for such a solution but with a fundamental explanatory gap (along with other well discussed problems); useful assigned probabilities like priors require substantive degrees of belief about the world. I assert that one does not have such substantive information about the world. Consequently, an explanation is needed for how one can be licensed to act as (...)
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  11. added 2015-07-28
    Determination, Uniformity, and Relevance: Normative Criteria for Generalization and Reasoning by Analogy.Todd R. Davies - 1988 - In David H. Helman (ed.), Analogical Reasoning. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 227-250.
    This paper defines the form of prior knowledge that is required for sound inferences by analogy and single-instance generalizations, in both logical and probabilistic reasoning. In the logical case, the first order determination rule defined in Davies (1985) is shown to solve both the justification and non-redundancy problems for analogical inference. The statistical analogue of determination that is put forward is termed 'uniformity'. Based on the semantics of determination and uniformity, a third notion of "relevance" is defined, both logically and (...)
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  12. added 2015-07-28
    A Logical Approach to Reasoning by Analogy.Todd R. Davies & Stuart J. Russell - 1987 - In John P. McDermott (ed.), Proceedings of the 10th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI'87). Morgan Kaufmann Publishers. pp. 264-270.
    We analyze the logical form of the domain knowledge that grounds analogical inferences and generalizations from a single instance. The form of the assumptions which justify analogies is given schematically as the "determination rule", so called because it expresses the relation of one set of variables determining the values of another set. The determination relation is a logical generalization of the different types of dependency relations defined in database theory. Specifically, we define determination as a relation between schemata of first (...)
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  13. added 2015-07-28
    Analogy.Todd Davies - 1985 - In CSLI Informal Notes Series. Stanford, CA, USA: Center for the Study of Language and Information, No. IN-CSLI-85-4,.
    This essay (a revised version of my undergraduate honors thesis at Stanford) constructs a theory of analogy as it applies to argumentation and reasoning, especially as used in fields such as philosophy and law. The word analogy has been used in different senses, which the essay defines. The theory developed herein applies to analogia rationis, or analogical reasoning. Building on the framework of situation theory, a type of logical relation called determination is defined. This determination relation solves a puzzle about (...)
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  14. added 2013-10-07
    Evidence, Hypothesis, and Grue.Alfred Schramm - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):571-591.
    Extant literature on Goodman’s ‘New Riddle of Induction’ deals mainly with two versions. I consider both of them, starting from the (‘epistemic’) version of Goodman’s classic of 1954. It turns out that it belongs to the realm of applications of inductive logic, and that it can be resolved by admitting only significant evidence (as I call it) for confirmations of hypotheses. Sect. 1 prepares some ground for the argument. As much of it depends on the notion of evidential significance, this (...)
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  15. added 2013-01-08
    Reply to Israel on the New Riddle of Induction.Robert Kowalenko - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):549-552.
    Israel 2004 claims that numerous philosophers have misinterpreted Goodman’s original ‘New Riddle of Induction’, and weakened it in the process, because they do not define ‘grue’ as referring to past observations. Both claims are false: Goodman clearly took the riddle to concern the maximally general problem of “projecting” any type of characteristic from a given realm of objects into another, and since this problem subsumes Israel’s, Goodman formulated a stronger philosophical challenge than the latter surmises.
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  16. added 2008-12-31
    Qualities, Universals, Kinds, and the New Riddle of Induction.F. Thomas Burke - 2002 - In F. Thomas Burke, D. Micah Hester & Robert B. Talisse (eds.), Dewey's Logical Theory: New Studies and Interpretations. Vanderbilt University Press.
    The limited aim here is to explain what John Dewey might say about the formulation of the grue example. Nelson Goodman’s problem of distinguishing good and bad inductive inferences is an important one, but the grue example misconstrues this complex problem for certain technical reasons, due to ambiguities that contemporary logical theory has not yet come to terms with. Goodman’s problem is a problem for the theory of induction and thus for logical theory in general. Behind the whole discussion of (...)
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