Subjective Thinking: Kierkegaard on Hegel's Socrates
Hegel Bulletin of Great Britain 61 (Spring / Summer):23-44 (2010)
Abstract
This essay considers the critical response to Hegel's view of Socrates we find in Kierkegaard's dissertation, The Concept of Irony. I argue that this dispute turns on the question whether or not the examination of particular thinkers enters into Socrates’ most basic aims and interests. I go on to show how Kierkegaard's account, which relies on an affirmative answer to this question, enables him to provide a cogent defence of Socrates' philosophical practice against Hegel's criticisms.
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2011-03-01
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554 ( #8,840 of 56,942 )
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31 ( #25,324 of 56,942 )
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