Selective Optimism About Mind-Uploading

Journal of Consciousness Studies (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Optimists about mind-uploading believe that we can survive uploading. Pessimists about mind-uploading, on the other hand, believe that we cannot survive uploading. An under-explored middle ground between the two is a selective form of optimism, which claims that we can survive some forms of uploading, such as gradual replacement uploading, but not others, such as scan-and-copy uploading. Is selective optimism about uploading a rational stance? In this paper I argue that the answer is: yes. The paper has a negative and a positive part. First, I defuse a recent objection against selective optimism from Wiley and Koene (2016). Wiley and Koene argue that gradual replacement uploading is metaphysically equivalent to scan-and-copy uploading, and hence optimism about the former and pessimism about the latter is unfounded. I show that Wiley and Koene’s case for the supposed metaphysical equivalence fails, since there is a significant metaphysical contrast between the two types of uploading involving immanent causation. In the second part of the paper, I present a positive case for selective optimism about gradual uploading building on this contrast in immanent causation.

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Clas Weber
University of Western Australia

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