Intrinsic values and reasons for action

Philosophical Issues 19 (1):342-363 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX


What reasons for action do we have? What explains why we have these reasons? This paper articulates some of the basic structural features of a theory that would provide answers to these questions. According to this theory, reasons for action are all grounded in intrinsic values, but in a way that makes room for a thoroughly non-consequentialist view of the way in which intrinsic values generate reasons for aaction.

Author's Profile

Ralph Wedgwood
University of Southern California


Added to PP

256 (#43,595)

6 months
34 (#59,839)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?