Truth is (Still) the Norm for Assertion: A Reply to Littlejohn

Erkenntnis 80 (6):1245-1253 (2015)
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Abstract
In a paper in this journal, I defend the view that truth is the fundamental norm for assertion and, in doing so, reject the view that knowledge is the fundamental norm for assertion. In a recent response, Littlejohn raises a number of objections against my arguments. In this reply, I argue that Littlejohn’s objections are unsuccessful
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge in an Uncertain World.Fantl, Jeremy & McGrath, Matthew
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Norms of Assertion.Lackey, Jennifer
Normativity.Thomson, Judith Jarvis

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2015-01-23

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