Being in a Position to Know is the Norm of Assertion

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):328-352 (2020)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This paper defends a new norm of assertion: Assert that p only if you are in a position to know that p. We test the norm by judging its performance in explaining three phenomena that appear jointly inexplicable at first: Moorean paradoxes, lottery propositions, and selfless assertions. The norm succeeds by tethering unassertability to unknowability while untethering belief from assertion. The PtK‐norm foregrounds the public nature of assertion as a practice that can be other‐regarding, allowing asserters to act in the best interests of their audience when psychological pressures would otherwise prevent them from communicating the knowable truth.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
WILBIA-5
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-01-30
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-01-30

Total views
159 ( #29,552 of 55,861 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
65 ( #10,730 of 55,861 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.