Failures of Categoricity and Compositionality for Intuitionistic Disjunction

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):281-291 (2012)
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Abstract
I show that the model-theoretic meaning that can be read off the natural deduction rules for disjunction fails to have certain desirable properties. I use this result to argue against a modest form of inferentialism which uses natural deduction rules to fix model-theoretic truth-conditions for logical connectives.
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2012
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First archival date: 2015-11-21
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