“Many people are saying…”: Applying the lessons of naïve skepticism to the fight against fake news and other “total bullshit”

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Abstract
‘Fake news’ has become an increasingly common refrain in public discourse, though the term itself has several uses, at least one of which constitutes Frankfurtian bullshit. After examining what sorts of fake news appeals do and do not count as bullshit, I discuss strategies for overcoming our openness to such bullshit. I do so by drawing a parallel between openness to bullshit and naïve skepticism—one’s willingness to reject the concept of truth on unsupported or ill-considered grounds—and suggest that this parallel indicates three principles for how we ought to combat our openness to fake news and other bullshit. First, the root causes of bullshit openness are not monolithic; we should adopt anti-bullshit strategies in recognition of this fact. Second, our efforts to overcome bullshit openness should be collaborative efforts to create an environment that allows for sustained interrogation of our bullshit openness, rather than a confrontational provision of contrary evidence, despite the fact that such strategies are more time-intensive. Third, social media is unlikely to be a fertile ground on which we will make meaningful progress in the fight against bullshit because of the inherent nature of social media platforms as spaces for short, declarative, confrontational claims.
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Archival date: 2019-05-10
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References found in this work BETA
The Psychology of Meta-Ethics: Exploring Objectivism.Goodwin, Geoffrey P. & Darley, John M.
Moral Objectivism Across the Lifespan.Beebe, James R. & Sackris, David
On Bullshit.Frankfurt, Harry G.

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2019-05-10

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