Truth, pluralism, monism, correspondence

In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave-Macmillan (2010)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
When talking about truth, we ordinarily take ourselves to be talking about one-and-the-same thing. Alethic monists suggest that theorizing about truth ought to begin with this default or pre-reflective stance, and, subsequently, parlay it into a set of theoretical principles that are aptly summarized by the thesis that truth is one. Foremost among them is the invariance principle.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
WRITPM
Revision history
First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 2 (2015-11-21)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2009-11-04

Total views
506 ( #5,325 of 40,765 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
20 ( #25,057 of 40,765 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.