Some Strong Conditionals for Sentential Logics

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Abstract
In this article I define a strong conditional for classical sentential logic, and then extend it to three non-classical sentential logics. It is stronger than the material conditional and is not subject to the standard paradoxes of material implication, nor is it subject to some of the standard paradoxes of C. I. Lewis’s strict implication. My conditional has some counterintuitive consequences of its own, but I think its pros outweigh its cons. In any case, one can always augment one’s language with more than one conditional, and it may be that no single conditional will satisfy all of our intuitions about how a conditional should behave. Finally, I suspect the strong conditional will be of more use for logic rather than the philosophy of language, and I will make no claim that the strong conditional is a good model for any particular use of the indicative conditional in English or other natural languages. Still, it would certainly be a nice bonus if some modified version of the strong conditional could serve as one. I begin by exploring some of the disadvantages of the material conditional, the strict conditional, and some relevant conditionals. I proceed to define a strong conditional for classical sentential logic. I go on to adapt this account to Graham Priest’s Logic of Paradox, to S. C. Kleene’s logic K3, and then to J. Łukasiewicz’s logic Ł, a standard version of fuzzy logic.
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First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 2 (2015-11-21)
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2012-12-12

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