Knowledge from Falsehood, Ignorance of Necessary Truths, and Safety

Philosophia:1-13 (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
According to the safety account of knowledge, one knows that p only if one’s belief could not easily have been false. An important issue for the account is whether we should only examine the target belief when evaluating whether a belief is safe or not. In this paper, it is argued that, if we should only examine the target belief, then the account fails to account for ignorance of necessary truths. But, if we should also examine beliefs in other relevant propositions, then the account fails to account for knowledge from falsehood. Therefore, the safety account of knowledge is undermined by knowledge from falsehood and ignorance of necessary truths.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2021-07-26
Latest version: 2 (2021-10-13)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
95 ( #47,765 of 65,538 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
95 ( #6,968 of 65,538 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.