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  1. Heidegger on being a person.John Haugeland - 1982 - Noûs 16 (1):15-26.
    This paper presents a non-standard and rather free-wheeling interpretation of "being and time", with emphasis on the first division. the author makes heidegger out to be less like husserl and/or sartre than is usual, and more like dewey and (to a lesser extent) sellars and the later wittgenstein. his central point concerns heidegger's radical divergence from the cartesian-kantian tradition regarding the fundamental question: what is a person?
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  • Syntax, semantics, physics.John Haugeland - 2002 - In John Mark Bishop & John Preston (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. London: Oxford University Press.
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  • Understanding natural language.John Haugeland - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (November):619-32.
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  • (1 other version)Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
    What psychological and philosophical significance should we attach to recent efforts at computer simulations of human cognitive capacities? In answering this question, I find it useful to distinguish what I will call "strong" AI from "weak" or "cautious" AI. According to weak AI, the principal value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion. (...)
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  • Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.Wilfrid Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
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  • Defending the bounds of cognition.Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
    That about sums up what is wrong with Clark's view.
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  • Challenges to the hypothesis of extended cognition.Robert D. Rupert - 2004 - Journal of Philosophy 101 (8):389-428.
    This paper -distinguishes between the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition and the Hypothesis of Embedded Cognition, characterizing them as competitors (both motivated by situated, interactive cognitive processing, with the latter being the more conservative of the two interpretations of the data) -clarifies the relation between content externalism and extended cognition -introduces the problem of cognitive bloat, as part of a critical discussion of Clark and Chalmers's "past-endorsement criterion" (if the criterion is embraced, we privilege the internal, endorsing process -- which looks (...)
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  • Extended Vision.Robert A. Wilson - 2010 - In Nivedita Gangopadhyay, Michael Madary & Finn Spicer (eds.), Perception, action, and consciousness: sensorimotor dynamics and two visual systems. New York: Oxford University Press USA.
    Vision constitutes an interesting domain, or range of domains, for debate over the extended mind thesis, the idea that minds physically extend beyond the boundaries of the body. In part this is because vision and visual experience more particularly are sometimes presented as a kind of line in the sand for what we might call externalist creep about the mind: once all reasonable concessions have been made to externalists about the mind, visual experience marks a line beyond which lies a (...)
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  • Authentic intentionality.John Haugeland - 2002 - In Matthias Scheutz (ed.), Computationalism: New Directions. MIT Press.
    What is the relation between computation and intennonality? Cognition presup- poses intentionality (or semantics). This much is certain. So, if, according to com- putationalism, cognition is computation, then computation, mo, presupposes..
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  • (1 other version)Intentionality as the mark of the mental.Tim Crane - 1998 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
    ‘It is of the very nature of consciousness to be intentional’ said Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘and a consciousness that ceases to be a consciousness of something would ipso facto cease to exist’.1 Sartre here endorses the central doctrine of Husserl’s phenomenology, itself inspired by a famous idea of Brentano’s: that intentionality, the mind’s ‘direction upon its objects’, is what is distinctive of mental phenomena. Brentano’s originality does not lie in pointing out the existence of intentionality, or in inventing the terminology, which (...)
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  • The Bounds of Cognition.Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 2008 - Malden, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by Kenneth Aizawa.
    A critique of the hypothesis of extended cognition.
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  • Pressing the flesh: A tension in the study of the embodied, embedded mind.Andy Clark - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):37–59.
    Mind, it is increasingly fashionable to assert, is an intrinsically embodied and environmentally embedded phenomenon. But there is a potential tension between two strands of thought prominent in this recent literature. One of those strands depicts the body as special, and the fine details of a creature’s embodiment as a major constraint on the nature of its mind: a kind of new-wave body-centrism. The other depicts the body as just one element in a kind of equal-partners dance between brain, body (...)
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  • Embodied Cognition: Lessons from Linguistic Determinism.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2011 - Philosophical Topics 39 (1):121-140.
    A line of research within embodied cognition seeks to show that an organism’s body is a determinant of its conceptual capacities. Comparison of this claim of body determinism to linguistic determinism bears interesting results. Just as Slobin’s (1996) idea of thinking for speaking challenges the main thesis of linguistic determinism, so too the possibility of thinking for acting raises difficulties for the proponent of body determinism. However, recent studies suggest that the body may, after all, have a determining role in (...)
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  • Rationality: An Essay Towards an Analysis. [REVIEW]Arthur W. Collins - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (10):253-261.
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  • The Bounds of Cognition.Sven Walter - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):43-64.
    An alarming number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that mind extends beyond the brain and body. This book evaluates these arguments and suggests that, typically, it does not. A timely and relevant study that exposes the need to develop a more sophisticated theory of cognition, while pointing to a bold new direction in exploring the nature of cognition Articulates and defends the “mark of the cognitive”, a common sense theory used to distinguish between cognitive and non-cognitive processes Challenges (...)
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  • In defense of some "cartesian" assumption concerning the brain and its operation.Rick Grush - 2003 - Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):53-92.
    I argue against a growing radical trend in current theoretical cognitive science that moves from the premises of embedded cognition, embodied cognition, dynamical systems theory and/or situated robotics to conclusions either to the effect that the mind is not in the brain or that cognition does not require representation, or both. I unearth the considerations at the foundation of this view: Haugeland's bandwidth-component argument to the effect that the brain is not a component in cognitive activity, and arguments inspired by (...)
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  • Action in Perception by Alva Noë. [REVIEW]Alva Noë - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (5):259-272.
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  • Fred Adams, Ken Aizawa: The Bounds of cognition. [REVIEW]Sven Walter & Miriam Kyselo - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (2):277-281.
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  • Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea.Barbara Von Eckardt - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (2):286.
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  • (1 other version)Consciousness in Action.Jennifer Church & S. L. Hurley - 1998 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):465.
    Hurley’s is a difficult book to work through—partly because of its length and the complexity of its arguments, but also because each of the ten essays of which it is composed has a rather different starting point and focus, and because few of her arguments achieve real closure. Essay 2 discusses competing interpretations of Kant, essay 4 articulates nonconceptual forms of self-consciousness, essay 5 offers fresh interpretations of commissurotomy patients’ behavior, essay 6 develops an objection to Wittgenstein on rule following, (...)
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  • The body in mind: Understanding cognitive processes.Alan Millar - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (4):621-623.
    Rowlands defends environmentalism, that is, the conjunction of the ontological claim that cognitive processes are not located exclusively inside the skin of cognizing organisms and the epistemological claim that it is not possible to understand the nature of cognitive processes by focusing exclusively on what is occurring inside the skin of cognizing organisms. Chapter 3 is devoted to explaining how environmentalism differs from other forms of externalism about the mental. The crucial points are that the arguments to be presented for (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Bounds of Cognition. [REVIEW]D. Browne - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):385-386.
    Tools and technologies expand our capacities, including our cognitive capacities. Microscopes extend our perceptual capacities. Notebooks extend the natural limits of memory. These facts are important, for all that they are obvious. The extended cognition hypothesis wants more. Some external devices and processes are literal parts of cognitive processes themselves. When there is fast and reliable access to external data or processes, then the cognitive processes that occur uncontroversially inside the brain literally and controversially extend out into the world to (...)
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