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  1. The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    1 Knowledge and Justification This book is an investigation of one central problem which arises in the attempt to give a philosophical account of empirical ...
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  • Knowledge and belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.
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  • Knowledge in a social world.Alvin I. Goldman - 1991 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge in a Social World offers a philosophy for the information age. Alvin Goldman explores new frontiers by creating a thoroughgoing social epistemology, moving beyond the traditional focus on solitary knowers. Against the tides of postmodernism and social constructionism Goldman defends the integrity of truth and shows how to promote it by well-designed forms of social interaction. From science to education, from law to democracy, he shows why and how public institutions should seek knowledge-enhancing practices. The result is a bold, (...)
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  • Concepts of Epistemic Justification.William P. Alston - 1985 - The Monist 68 (1):57-89.
    Justification, or at least ‘justification’, bulks large in recent epistemology. The view that knowledge consists of true-justified-belief has been prominent in this century, and the justification of belief has attracted considerable attention in its own right. But it is usually not at all clear just what an epistemologist means by ‘justified’, just what concept the term is used to express. An enormous amount of energy has gone into the attempt to specify conditions under which beliefs of one or another sort (...)
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  • Pathways to knowledge: private and public.Alvin I. Goldman - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    How can we know? How can we attain justified belief? These traditional questions in epistemology have inspired philosophers for centuries. Now, in this exceptional work, Alvin Goldman, distinguished scholar and leader in the fields of epistemology and mind, approaches such inquiries as legitimate methods or "pathways" to knowledge. He examines the notion of private and public knowledge, arguing for the epistemic legitimacy of private and introspective methods of gaining knowledge, yet acknowledging the equal importance of social and public mechanisms in (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.Paul K. Moser - 1985 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (4):670-673.
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  • (1 other version)Why knowledge is merely true belief.Crispin Sartwell - 1992 - Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):167-180.
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  • The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.Terry J. Christlieb - 1987 - Noûs 21 (3):427-429.
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  • (1 other version)Knowledge is Merely True Belief.Crispin Sartwell - 1991 - American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (2):157-165.
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  • (3 other versions)Knowledge.K. Lehrer - 1974 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 38 (2):326-327.
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  • Knowledge.Robert Binkley - 1977 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (2):268-270.
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  • Our errant epistemic aim.Stephen Maitzen - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4):869-876.
    Often the first issue addressed by a theory of justified belief is the aim, goal, purpose, or objective of epistemic justification. What, in short, is the point of epistemic justification? Or, to put it a bit differently, why value justification: why is it worth having or pursuing? Prominent epistemologists, including both externalists and internalists, have proposed the following answer: the ultimate aim of epistemic justification is to maximize true belief and minimize false belief. This answer specifies what I’ll call the (...)
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  • Our epistemic goal.Andrew Latus - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):28 – 39.
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  • Is mere true belief knowledge?Pierre Le Morvan - 2002 - Erkenntnis 56 (2):151-168.
    Crispin Sartwell ingeniously defends the provocative thesis that mere true belief suffices for knowledge. In doing so, he challenges one of the most deeply entrenched epistemological tenets, namely that knowledge must be more than mere true belief. Particularly interesting is the way he defends his thesis by appealing to considerations adduced by such prominent epistemologists as William Alston, Laurence BonJour, Alvin Goldman and Paul Moser, each of whom denies that knowledge is merely true belief. In this paper, I argue that (...)
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  • Sartwell's minimalist analysis of knowing.William G. Lycan - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 73 (1):1 - 3.
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  • Confidence in unwarranted knowledge.David B. Martens - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (2):143 - 164.
    Epistemic minimalism affirms that mere true belief is sufficient for propositional knowledge. I construct a taxonomy of some specific forms of minimalism and locate within that taxonomy the distinct positions of various advocates of minimalism, including Alvin Goldman, Jaakko Hintikka, Crispin Sartwell, Wolfgang Lenzen, Franz von Kutschera, and others. I weigh generic minimalism against William Lycan’s objection that minimalism is incompatible with plausible principles about relations between knowledge, belief, and confidence. I argue that Lycan’s objection fails for equivocation but that (...)
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  • On Sartwell’s Thesis That Knowledge is Merely True Belief.Art Skidmore - 1997 - Southwest Philosophy Review 13 (1):123-127.
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  • Epistemic Means and Ends: In Defense of Some Sartwellian Insights.Frank Hofmann - 2005 - Synthese 146 (3):357-369.
    The question of what means-and-ends structure our epistemic endeavors have is an important issue in recent epistemology, and is fundamental for understanding epistemic matters in principle. Crispin Sartwell has proposed arguments for the view that knowledge is our only ultimate goal, and justification is no part of it. An important argument is his instrumentality argument which is concerned with the conditions under which something could belong to our ultimate epistemic goal. Recently, this argument has been reconstructed and criticized by Pierre (...)
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  • Epistemic Deflationism.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):103-134.
    The aim of this paper is to look at what a parallel deflationist program might be in the theory of knowledge and examine its prospect. In what follows I will simplify matters slightly by focussing on empirical knowledge rather than knowledge in general, though most of what I have to say ought to be applicable, mutatis mutandis, to knowledge in general. Moreover,note that it is not my aim to offer a full defense of a particular deflationist theory of knowledge, which (...)
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  • (1 other version)Cognitive science and naturalized epistemology: A review of Alvin I. Goldman's Epistemology and Cognition[REVIEW]Gerald W. Glaser - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (2):161-164.
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