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Nelkin on the Lottery Paradox.Igor Douven - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):395-404.details
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What Moore's Paradox Is About.Claudio de Almeida - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):33-58.details
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Epistemic justification and epistemic luck.Job de Grefte - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3821-3836.details
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Presumption as a Modal Qualifier: Presumption, Inference, and Managing Epistemic Risk.David Godden - 2017 - Argumentation 31 (3):485-511.details
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An Isolation Objection to Phenomenal Conservatism.Kevin McCain - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (6):1381-1390.details
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Anti-Intellectualism.Blake Roeber - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):437-466.details
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Scientific Antirealists Have Set Fire to Their Own Houses.Seungbae Park - 2017 - Prolegomena 16 (1):23-37.details
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The Concept of Argument: A Philosophical Foundation.Harald R. Wohlrapp - 2014 - Dordrecht NL: Springer.details
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What is Understanding? An Overview of Recent Debates in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science.Christoph Baumberger, Claus Beisbart & Georg Brun - 2017 - In Stephen Grimm Christoph Baumberger & Sabine Ammon (eds.), Explaining Understanding: New Perspectives from Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Routledge. pp. 1-34.details
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The Aim of Belief and the Goal of Truth: Reflections on Rosenberg.Matthew Chrisman - 2016 - In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 357-382.details
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Epistemic instrumentalism and the reason to believe in accord with the evidence.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3791-3809.details
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The Truth-Conduciveness Problem of Coherentism and a Sellarsian Explanatory Coherence Theory.Byeong D. Lee - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (1):63-79.details
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Believing in Perceiving: Known Illusions and the Classical Dual‐Component Theory.Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):550-575.details
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The Shoulders of Giants: A Case for Non-veritism about Expert Authority.Jamie Carlin Watson - 2018 - Topoi 37 (1):39-53.details
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What Is Justified Group Belief.Jennifer Lackey - 2016 - Philosophical Review Recent Issues 125 (3):341-396.details
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Reflective Equilibrium.Yuri Cath - 2016 - In Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 213-230.details
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Justified Belief from Unjustified Belief.Peter Murphy - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (4):602-617.details
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The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification.Paul Silva - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1).details
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Rationality, reasoning and rules: reflections on Broome’s rationality through reasoning.Paul Boghossian - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3385-3397.details
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A Pluralist Account of Knowledge as a Natural Kind.Andreas Stephens - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (3):885-903.details
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Carnap’s Relevance Measure as a Probabilistic Measure of Coherence.Jakob Koscholke - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (2):339-350.details
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Epistemic inconsistency and categorical coherence: a study of probabilistic measures of coherence.Michael Hughes - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):3153-3185.details
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Hearsay viewed through the lens of trust, reputation and coherence.Francesco Martini - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):4083-4099.details
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Engel on doxastic correctness.Conor McHugh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1451-1462.details
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Extended Cognition and Propositional Memory.J. Adam Carter & Jesper Kallestrup - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):691-714.details
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Two new objections to explanationism.Bryan C. Appley & Gregory Stoutenburg - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):3069-3084.details
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Belief and Self‐Knowledge: Lessons From Moore's Paradox.Declan Smithies - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):393-421.details
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Internalism and Entitlement to Rules and Methods.Joshua Schechter - 2020 - In Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Internalism and Externalism.B. J. C. Madison - 2017 - In Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. New York: Routledge. pp. 283-295.details
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Responsible belief and epistemic justification.Rik Peels - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2895-2915.details
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Basic beliefs and the perceptual learning problem: A substantial challenge for moderate foundationalism.Bram Vaassen - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):133-149.details
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On Correspondence.Stephan Hartmann - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 33 (1):79-94.details
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Probabilistic Justification and the Regress Problem.Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson - 2008 - Studia Logica 89 (3):333-341.details
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Gert on Subjective Practical Rationality.Christian Miller - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):551-561.details
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Circular testimony.Stephen Wright - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2029-2048.details
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Response to critics.Jack Lyons - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (3):477-488.details
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Bonjour’s Arguments against Skepticism about the A Priori.James R. Beebe - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (2):243-267.details
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Aiming at Truth: Doxastic vs. Epistemic Goals.Hamid Vahid - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (2):303-335.details
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The Ambiguity of Quantifiers.Francesco Paoli - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 124 (3):313-330.details
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Moorean Facts and Belief Revision, or Can the Skeptic Win?Thomas Kelly - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):179-209.details
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Why we don’t deserve credit for everything we know.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):345-361.details
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A Brief Remark on Non-prioritized Belief Change and the Monotony Postulate.Gordian Haas - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (3):319-322.details
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The Structure of Cognitive Agency.Daniel Breyer - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (3):285-296.details
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Against an Inferentialist Dogma.Thomas Raleigh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1397-1421.details
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Is Forgotten Evidence a Problem for Evidentialism?Kevin McCain - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (4):471-480.details
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Bootstrapping in General.Jonathan Weisberg - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):525-548.details
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Robustness, Diversity of Evidence, and Probabilistic Independence.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2015 - In Uskali Mäki, Stéphanie Ruphy, Gerhard Schurz & Ioannis Votsis (eds.), Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science. Cham: Springer. pp. 305-316.details
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Competing accounts of contrastive coherence.Michael Schippers - 2016 - Synthese 193 (10).details
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