Bentham's best-known book stands as a classic of both philosophy and jurisprudence. The 1789 work articulates an important statement of the foundations of utilitarian philosophy — it also represents a pioneering study of crime and punishment. Bentham's reasoning remains central to contemporary debates in moral and political philosophy, economics, and legal theory.

Economics as a science of human behavior has been grounded in a remarkably parsimonious postulate: that of the self-interested, isolated individual who chooses freely and rationally between alternative courses of action after computing their prospective costs and benefits. In recent decades, a group of economists has shown considerable industry and ingenuity in applying this way of interpreting the social world to a series of ostensibly noneconomic phenomena, from crime to the family, and from collective action to democracy. The “economic” or (...) “rational-actor” approach has yielded some important insights, but its onward sweep has also revealed some of its intrinsic weaknesses. As a result, it has become possible to mount a critique which, ironically, can be carried all the way back to the heartland of the would-be conquering discipline. That the economic approach presents us with too simpleminded an account of even such fundamental economic processes as consumption and production is the basic thesis of the present paper. (shrink)

This paper analyzes some issues that emerge in attempts to distinguish and relate "moral" and "nonmora1' action-guides. It examines one material criterion (otherregardingness) and three formal criteria (universalizability, prescriptivity, and overridingness) and considers whether they constitute necessary and/or sufficient conditions of "morality." It treats these criteria in relation to ideals and prudential, political, and religious considerations. Furthermore, it contends that the classification of action-guides as moral or nonmoral should not prejudge their respective weights or replace substantive moral debate. The formal (...) and material criteria may determine what counts as morality, not how much morality counts. (shrink)