I argue that in order to solve the main difficulties confronted by the classical versions of the causal theory of action, it is necessary no just to make room for intentions, considered as irreducible to complexes of beliefs and desires, but also to distinguish among several types of intentions. I present a three-tiered theory of intentions that distinguishes among future-directed intentions, present-directed intentions and motor intentions. I characterize each kind of intention in terms of its functions, its type of content, (...) its dynamics and the rationality and time constraints that bear on it. I then try to show how the difficulties encountered by the causal theory can be solved within this new framework. 1. (shrink)

In this paper I aim at discussing the following questions: is improvisation an intentional action? If it is an intentional action, in what sense is improvisation intentional? Can improvisation contribute to the understanding of intentional action? I will argue that improvisation is not a bizarre case of action or a weakened action, but an intentional action in the proper sense. Moreover, improvisation exemplifies key features of intentional action as such.