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Suspended judgment.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.details
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An inconsistency in direct reference theory.George Bealer - 2004 - Journal of Philosophy 101 (11):574 - 593.details
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Pure Russellianism.Sean Crawford - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (2):171-202.details
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Frege’s Puzzle (2nd edition).Nathan U. Salmon - 1986 - Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company.details
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(1 other version)On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 2005 - Mind 114 (456):873 - 887.details
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Analysis.Michael Beaney - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Illogical Belief.Nathan Salmon - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:243-285.details
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Quantifiers and propositional attitudes.Willard van Orman Quine - 1955 - Journal of Philosophy 53 (5):177-187.details
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(1 other version)A puzzle about belief.Saul A. Kripke - 1979 - In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. pp. 239--83.details
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The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.details
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A solution for Russellians to a puzzle about belief.Sean Crawford - 2004 - Analysis 64 (3):223-29.details
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Beyond rigidity: the unfinished semantic agenda of Naming and necessity.Scott Soames - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Quantifying in.David Kaplan - 1968 - Synthese 19 (1-2):178-214.details
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Understanding belief reports.David Braun - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):555-595.details
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On non-pragmatic Millianism.Andrea Onofri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):305-327.details
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A pragmatic solution to Ostertag’s puzzle.Philip Atkins - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):359-365.details
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Naming and Asserting.Scott Soames - 2004 - In Zoltan Gendler Szabo (ed.), Semantics Versus Pragmatics. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 356--382.details
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Frege's Puzzle and Descriptive Enrichment.Jeff Speaks - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):267-282.details
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A new starting place for the semantics of belief sentences.Erin L. Eaker - 2009 - In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The philosophy of David Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 208--232.details
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Analyzing analysis.C. Anthony Anderson - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 72 (2-3):199 - 222.details
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Do belief reports report beliefs?Kent Bach - 1997 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):215-241.details
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Analysis.Michael Beaney - 2017 - Routledge.details
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A Defense of Millian Descriptivism.Philip Atkins - 2013 - Dissertation, University of California at Santa Barbaradetails
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I Falsely Believe That P.Mark Crimmins - 1992 - Analysis 52 (3):191.details
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The Very Possibility of Language: A Sermon on the Consequences of Missing Church.Nathan Salmon - 2001 - In C. Anthony Anderson & Michael Zelëny (eds.), Logic, meaning, and computation: essays in memory of Alonzo Church. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.details
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A Millian propositional guise for one puzzling English gal.Chris Tillman - 2005 - Analysis 65 (3):251–258.details
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Relative and Absolute Apriority.Nathan Salmon - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 69 (1):83 - 100.details
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Being of Two Minds: Belief with Doubt.Nathan Salmon - 1995 - Noûs 29 (1):1-20.details
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Millian descriptivism.Ben Caplan - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (2):181-198.details
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Is Belief a Propositional Attitude?Ray Buchanan - 2012 - Philosophers' Imprint 12.details
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David Kaplan on De Re belief.Erin L. Eaker - 2004 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28 (1):379–395.details
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De Re Belief.David Kaplan - 2013 - In Richard Hull (ed.), Presidential Addresses of The American Philosophical Association 1981–1990. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 25-37.details
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(1 other version)Has Semantics Rested on a Mistake?Howard Wettstein - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):185-209.details
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