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The psychology of folk psychology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.details
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Pictures and singular thought.John Zeimbekis - 2010 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 68 (1):11-21.details
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Proper nouns.Samuel Cumming - 2007 - Dissertation, Rutgers - New Brunswickdetails
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Singular Thought and the Contingent.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2008 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 243 (1):79-98.details
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Singular Thought and the Contingent A Priori.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2008 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 1:79-98.details
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Continuants, identity and essentialism.Nicholas Unwin - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3375-3394.details
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Frege and the Logic of Sense and Reference.Kevin C. Klement - 2001 - New York: Routledge.details
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Counterfactual Attitudes and Multi-Centered Worlds.Dilip Ninan - 2012 - Semantics and Pragmatics 5 (5):1-57.details
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Self‐Location and Other‐Location.Dilip Ninan - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):301-331.details
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Methodological deflationism and metaphysical grounding: from because_ via _truth_ to _ground.Johannes Stern - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Pure Logic and Higher-order Metaphysics.Christopher Menzel - 2024 - In Peter Fritz & Nicholas K. Jones (eds.), Higher-Order Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.details
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The Logicality of Language: Contextualism versus Semantic Minimalism.Guillermo Del Pinal - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):381-427.details
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Liberal Thinking.John Turri - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):515-533.details
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Brentano on Intentionality.Tim Crane - 2017 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 41-48.details
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The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School.Uriah Kriegel (ed.) - 2017 - London and New York: Routledge.details
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Kaplan’s Counterexample to Quine’s Theorem.Paolo Bonardi - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (2):196-223.details
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The Talk I Was Supposed to Give….Achille C. Varzi - 2006 - In Andrea Bottani & Richard Davies (eds.), Modes of Existence: Papers in Ontology and Philosophical Logic. Ontos Verlag. pp. 131–152.details
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Abstraction and Grounding.Louis deRosset & Øystein Linnebo - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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Science, philosophy, and interpretation.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):535.details
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Precis of the intentional stance.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):495-505.details
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Inside names.Denis Delfitto & Gaetano Fiorin - 2022 - Evolutionary Linguistic Theory 4 (2):153-190.details
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The notional world of D. C. Dennett.Arthur C. Danto - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):509.details
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The anthropology of folk psychology.Steven Daniel - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):38-39.details
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Policy Externalism.Daniel Drucker - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3).details
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Semantic Verbs Are Intensional Transitives.Justin D’Ambrosio - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):213-248.details
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Prior's puzzle generalized.Justin D'Ambrosio - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):196-220.details
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A New Perceptual Adverbialism.Justin D'Ambrosio - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (8):413-446.details
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Martin haspelmath, indefinite pronouns.Östen Dahl - 1999 - Linguistics and Philosophy 22 (6):663-678.details
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How directly do we know our minds?Maria Czyzewska & Pawel Lewicki - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):37-38.details
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Dennett's realisation theory of the relation between folk and scientific psychology.Adrian Cussins - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):508.details
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Variabilism.Samuel Cumming - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (4):525-554.details
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Indefinites and intentional identity.Samuel Cumming - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):371-395.details
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Quotational theories of propositional attitudes.M. J. Cresswell - 1980 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 9 (1):17 - 40.details
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De re belief generalized.Maxwell J. Cresswell & Arnim Stechow - 1982 - Linguistics and Philosophy 5 (4):503 - 535.details
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Singular Thought.Tim Crane & Jody Azzouni - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):21-43.details
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Quantifiers and propositional attitudes: Quine revisited.Sean Crawford - 2008 - Synthese 160 (1):75 - 96.details
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Propositional or Non-Propositional Attitudes?Sean Crawford - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (1):179-210.details
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De Re and De Dicto Explanation of Action.Sean Crawford - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):783-798.details
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Brandom and Quine on Perspectivally Hybrid De Re Attitude Ascription: A Solution to a Problem in the Explanation of Action.Sean Crawford - 2022 - Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 3 (1):103-121.details
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Free Quantified Epistemic Logics.Giovanna Corsi & Eugenio Orlandelli - 2013 - Studia Logica 101 (6):1159-1183.details
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Cutting it (too) fine.John Collins - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):143-172.details
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The ontological status of intentional states: Nailing folk psychology to its perch.Paul M. Churchland - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):507.details
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Another “Just So” story: How the leopardguarders spot.Dorothy Cheney & Robert Seyfarth - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):506.details
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The naked truth about first-person knowledge.Michael Chandler & Jeremy Carpendale - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):36-37.details
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Self-ascription without qualia: A case study.David J. Chalmers - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):35-36.details
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Referential Opacity and Epistemic Logic.Saloua Chatti - 2011 - Logica Universalis 5 (2):225-247.details
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Categorization, theories and folk psychology.Nick Chater - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):37-37.details
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There's more to mental states than meets the inner “l”.Kimberly Wright Cassidy - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):34-35.details
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Tomberlin, Frege, and guise theory: A note on the methodology of dia-philosophical comparisons.Hector-Neri Castañeda - 1984 - Synthese 61 (2):135 - 147.details
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