- Suspended Judgement Rebooted.Benoit Guilielmo - forthcoming - Logos and Episteme.details
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Doubt and Suspension: Two Attitudes or One?Benoit Guilielmo - forthcoming - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia.details
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Inquiring Attitudes and Erotetic Logic: Norms of Restriction and Expansion.Dennis Whitcomb & Jared Millson - 2024 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 10 (3):444-466.details
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What do we do when we suspend judgement?Anne Meylan - 2024 - Philosophical Issues 34 (1):253-270.details
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(1 other version)The Quest for Certainty.Luca Zanetti - 2021 - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):71-95.details
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On the Nature and Relationship of Individual and Collective Justification.Simon Graf - 2024 - Dissertation, University of Leedsdetails
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Against fake news.Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues - 2024 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 69 (1):e45041.details
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Epistemic Courage.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2024 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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In defence of object-given reasons.Michael Vollmer - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):485-511.details
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Argumentation-induced rational issue polarisation.Felix Kopecky - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (1):83-107.details
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How should we ascribe the third stance?Luis Rosa - forthcoming - In Alexandra Zinke & Verena Wagner (eds.), Suspension in Epistemology and Beyond. Routledge.details
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Withhold by Default: A Difference Between Epistemic and Practical Rationality.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-24.details
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Trust Responsibly: Non-Evidential Virtue Epistemology.Jakob Ohlhorst - 2023 - New York City: Routledge.details
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Making sense of things: Moral inquiry as hermeneutical inquiry.Paulina Sliwa - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (1):117-137.details
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Sextus and the Nature of Suspension.Robb Dunphy - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (4):2241-2259.details
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Recent Work on Skepticism in Epistemology.Chris Ranalli - 2023 - American Philosophical Quarterly 60 (3):257-273.details
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Acceptance and the ethics of belief.Laura K. Soter - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (8):2213-2243.details
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Higher-Order Evidence in Aesthetics.Daniel Whiting - 2023 - British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (2):143-155.details
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Inquiring Attitudes and Erotetic Logic: Norms of Restriction and Expansion.Dennis Whitcomb & Jared Millson - 2024 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 10 (3):444-466.details
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The Uniqueness Thesis: A Hybrid Approach.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Sussexdetails
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The questioning-attitude account of agnosticism.Avery Archer - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-15.details
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Epistemic Sanity or Why You Shouldn't be Opinionated or Skeptical.Danilo Fraga Dantas - 2022 - Episteme 20 (3):647-666.details
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Coherence as Joint Satisfiability.Samuel Fullhart & Camilo Martinez - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (2):312-332.details
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Doubt.Luis Rosa - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.details
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Suspending Judgment is Something You Do.Lindsay Crawford - 2022 - Episteme 19 (4):561-577.details
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You ought to have known: positive epistemic norms in a knowledge-first framework.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-23.details
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Committed Neutrality in the Rational Mind.Jane Friedman - 2022 - Analysis 82 (4):754-765.details
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The Propagation of Suspension of Judgment.Aldo Filomeno - 2022 - Erkenntnis 89 (4):1327-1348.details
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Phenomenal Explanationism and the Look of Things.Kevin McCain & Luca Moretti - 2023 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 217-232.details
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Fittingness first?: Reasons to withhold belief.Wooram Lee - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3565-3581.details
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When the (Bayesian) ideal is not ideal.Danilo Fraga Dantas - 2023 - Logos and Episteme 15 (3):271-298.details
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Disagreement and suspended judgement.Filippo Ferrari - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (4):526-542.details
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Na-na, na-na, Boo-Boo, the accuracy of your philosophical beliefs is doo-doo.Mark Walker - 2022 - Manuscrito 45 (2):1-49.details
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Thinking and being sure.Jeremy Goodman & Ben Holguín - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):634-654.details
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The rationality of eating disorders.Stephen Gadsby - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (3):732-749.details
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#MeToo & the role of Outright Belief.Alexandra Lloyd - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (2):181-197.details
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Inquiring Minds Want to Improve.Arianna Falbo - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (2).details
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Coherence and Knowability.Luis Rosa - 2022 - The Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):960-978.details
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Spinozan Doxasticism About Delusions.Federico Bongiorno - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (4):720-752.details
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(1 other version)What is White Ignorance?Annette Martín - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4):pqaa073.details
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Hanlon’s Razor.Nathan Ballantyne & Peter H. Ditto - 2021 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 45:309-331.details
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What Makes Something Surprising?Dan Baras & Oded Na’Aman - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1):195-215.details
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Inquiry and Confirmation.Arianna Falbo - 2021 - Analysis 81 (4):622–631.details
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Epistemic dilemma and epistemic conflict.Verena Wagner - 2020 - In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York: Routledge. pp. 58-76.details
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Being neutral: Agnosticism, inquiry and the suspension of judgment.Matthew McGrath - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):463-484.details
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No Justification for Smith’s Incidentally True Beliefs.Alfred Schramm - 2022 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 99 (2):273–292.details
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Why undermining evolutionary debunkers is not enough.Andrew del Rio - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7437-7452.details
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Profiling, Neutrality, and Social Equality.Lewis Ross - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (4):808-824.details
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When in Doubt, Withhold: A Defense of Two Rational Grounds for Withholding.A. K. Flowerree - 2021 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Salience reasoning in coordination games.Julius Schönherr - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6601-6620.details
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