According to the dominant position among philosophers of language today, we can legitimately ascribe determinate contents to natural language sentences, independently of what the speaker actually means. This view contrasts with that held by ordinary language philosophers fifty years ago: according to them, speech acts, not sentences, are the primary bearers of content. François Recanati argues for the relevance of this controversy to the current debate about semantics and pragmatics. Is 'what is said' determined by linguistic conventions, or is it (...) an aspect of 'speaker's meaning'? Do we need pragmatics to fix truth-conditions? What is 'literal meaning'? To what extent is semantic composition a creative process? How pervasive is context-sensitivity? Recanati provides an original and insightful defence of 'contextualism', and offers an informed survey of the spectrum of positions held by linguists and philosophers working at the semantics/pragmatics interface. (shrink)

This paper investigates the way that linguistic expressions influence vagueness, focusing on the interpretation of the positive (unmarked) form of gradable adjectives. I begin by developing a semantic analysis of the positive form of ‘relative’ gradable adjectives, expanding on previous proposals by further motivating a semantic basis for vagueness and by precisely identifying and characterizing the division of labor between the compositional and contextual aspects of its interpretation. I then introduce a challenge to the analysis from the class of ‘absolute’ (...) gradable adjectives: adjectives that are demonstrably gradable, but which have positive forms that relate objects to maximal or minimal degrees, and do not give rise to vagueness. I argue that the truth conditional difference between relative and absolute adjectives in the positive form stems from the interaction of lexical semantic properties of gradable adjectives—the structure of the scales they use—and a general constraint on interpretive economy that requires truth conditions to be computed on the basis of conventional meaning to the extent possible, allowing for context dependent truth conditions only as a last resort. (shrink)

Comparative constructions form two classes, those that permit direct comparisons (comparisons of measurements as in Seymour is taller than he is wide) and those that only allow indirect comparisons (comparisons of relative positions on separate scales as in Esme is more beautiful than Einstein is intelligent). In contrast with other semantic theories, this paper proposes that the interpretation of the comparative morpheme remains the same whether it appears in sentences that compare individuals directly or indirectly. To develop a unified account, (...) I suggest that all comparisons (whether in terms of height, intelligence or beauty) involve a scale of universal degrees that are isomorphic to the rational (fractional) numbers between 0 and 1. Crucial to a unified treatment, the connection between the individuals being compared and universal degrees involves two steps. First individuals are mapped to a value on a primary scale that ranks individuals with respect to the gradable property (whether it be height, beauty or intelligence). Second, the value on the primary scale is mapped to a universal degree that encodes the value’s relative position on the primary scale. Direct comparison results if measurements such as seven feet participate in the primary scale (as in Seven feet is tall). Otherwise the result is an indirect comparison. (shrink)

Comparative constructions allow individuals to be compared according to different properties. Such comparisons form two classes, those that permit direct, comparisons and those that only allow indirect comparisons. Traditionally, these two types of comparisons have been associated with an ambiguity in the interpretations of the comparative and equative morphemes. In this thesis, I propose that there is no such ambiguity. The interpretations of the comparative and equative morphemes remain the same whether they appear in sentences that compare individuals directly or (...) relative to two separate scales. To develop a unified account, I suggest that all comparisons involve a scale of universal degrees that are isomorphic to the rational numbers between 0 and 1. All comparative and equative constructions are assigned an interpretation based on a comparison of such degrees. These degrees are associated with the two individuals being compared. Crucial to a unified treatment, the connection between individuals and universal degrees involves two steps. First individuals are mapped to a value on a primary scale that respects the ordering of such individuals according to the quality under consideration. Second, this value on the primary scale is mapped to a universal degree that encodes the value's relative position with respect to other values. It is the ability of iv the universal degrees to encode positions on a primary scale that enables comparative and equative morphemes to either compare individuals directly or indirectly. A direct comparison results if measurements such as seven feet participate in the gradable property. Such participation can sometimes result in an isomorphism between two primary scales and the ordering of measurements in a measurement system. When this occurs, comparing positions in the primary scales is equivalent to comparing measurements. If this type of isomorphism cannot be established then the sentence yields an indirect comparison. (shrink)