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  1. (5 other versions)What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (4):435-50.
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  • (1 other version)Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
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  • (5 other versions)What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 435 - 450.
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  • (2 other versions)Troubles with functionalism.Ned Block - 1978 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:261-325.
    The functionalist view of the nature of the mind is now widely accepted. Like behaviorism and physicalism, functionalism seeks to answer the question "What are mental states?" I shall be concerned with identity thesis formulations of functionalism. They say, for example, that pain is a functional state, just as identity thesis formulations of physicalism say that pain is a physical state.
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  • (1 other version)Psychophysical and theoretical identifications.David K. Lewis - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):249-258.
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  • Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology.Gregory Currie & Ian Ravenscroft - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. Edited by Christoph Hoerl.
    Recreative Minds develops a philosophical theory of imagination that draws upon the latest work in psychology. This theory illuminates the use of imagination in coming to terms with art, its role in enabling us to live as social beings, and the psychological consequences of disordered imagination. The authors offer a lucid exploration of a fascinating subject.
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  • (5 other versions)What is it Like to be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • An argument for basic emotions.Paul Ekman - 1992 - Cognition and Emotion 6 (3):169-200.
    Emotions are viewed as having evolved through their adaptive value in dealing with fundamental life-tasks. Each emotion has unique features: signal, physiology, and antecedent events. Each emotion also has characteristics in common with other emotions: rapid onset, short duration, unbidden occurrence, automatic appraisal, and coherence among responses. These shared and unique characteristics are the product of our evolution, and distinguish emotions from other affective phenomena.
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  • Folk psychology as simulation.Robert M. Gordon - 1986 - Mind and Language 1 (2):158-71.
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  • (1 other version)Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-reading.Vittorio Gallese & Alvin I. Goldman - 1998 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2 (12):493–501.
    A new class of visuomotor neuron has been recently discovered in the monkey’s premotor cortex: mirror neurons. These neurons respond both when a particular action is performed by the recorded monkey and when the same action, performed by another individual, is observed. Mirror neurons appear to form a cortical system matching observation and execution of goal-related motor actions. Experimental evidence suggests that a similar matching system also exists in humans. What might be the functional role of this matching system? One (...)
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  • Words, Thoughts, and Theories.Alison Gopnik - 1997 - Cambridge: MIT Press. Edited by Andrew N. Meltzoff.
    Recently, the theory theory has led to much interesting research. However, this is the first book to look at the theory in extensive detail and to systematically contrast it with other theories.
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  • Why the Child’s Theory of Mind Really Is a Theory.Alison Gopnik & Henry M. Wellman - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):145-71.
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  • Interpretation psychologized.Alvin I. Goldman - 1989 - Mind and Language 4 (3):161-85.
    The aim of this paper is to study interpretation, specifically, to work toward an account of interpretation that seems descriptively and explanatorily correct. No account of interpretation can be philosophically helpful, I submit, if it is incompatible with a correct account of what people actually do when they interpret others. My question, then, is: how does the (naive) interpreter arrive at his/her judgments about the mental attitudes of others? Philosophers who have addressed this question have not, in my view, been (...)
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  • A unifying view of the basis of social cognition.Vittorio Gallese, Christian Keysers & Giacomo Rizzolatti - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (9):396-403.
    In this article we provide a unifying neural hypothesis on how individuals understand the actions and emotions of others. Our main claim is that the fundamental mechanism at the basis of the experiential understanding of others' actions is the activation of the mirror neuron system. A similar mechanism, but involving the activation of viscero-motor centers, underlies the experiential understanding of the emotions of others.
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  • Words, Thoughts, and Theories.Alison Gopnik & Andrew N. Meltzoff - 1999 - Mind 108 (430):395-398.
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  • (1 other version)Psychophysical and theoretical identifications.David Lewis - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Modularity, development and "theory of mind".Alan M. Leslie & Brian J. Scholl - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (1):131-153.
    Psychologists and philosophers have recently been exploring whether the mechanisms which underlie the acquisition of ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) are best charac- terized as cognitive modules or as developing theories. In this paper, we attempt to clarify what a modular account of ToM entails, and why it is an attractive type of explanation. Intuitions and arguments in this debate often turn on the role of develop- ment: traditional research on ToM focuses on various developmental sequences, whereas cognitive modules are thought (...)
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  • (3 other versions)Folk psychology.Stephen P. Stich & Shaun Nichols - 2002 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 35-71.
    For the last 25 years discussions and debates about commonsense psychology (or “folk psychology,” as it is often called) have been center stage in the philosophy of mind. There have been heated disagreements both about what folk psychology is and about how it is related to the scientific understanding of the mind/brain that is emerging in psychology and the neurosciences. In this chapter we will begin by explaining why folk psychology plays such an important role in the philosophy of mind. (...)
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  • (1 other version)Folk psychology: Simulation or tacit theory?Stephen Stich & Shaun Nichols - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):35-71.
    A central goal of contemporary cognitive science is the explanation of cognitive abilities or capacities. [Cummins 1983] During the last three decades a wide range of cognitive capacities have been subjected to careful empirical scrutiny. The adult's ability to produce and comprehend natural language sentences and the child's capacity to acquire a natural language were among the first to be explored. [Chomsky 1965, Fodor, Bever & Garrett 1974, Pinker 1989] There is also a rich literature on the ability to solve (...)
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  • A perspective on disgust.Paul Rozin & April E. Fallon - 1987 - Psychological Review 94 (1):23-41.
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  • Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology.Gregory Currie & Ian Ravenscroft - 2004 - Philosophy 79 (308):331-335.
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  • Simulationist Models of Face-based Emotion Recognition.Alvin I. Goldman & Chandra Sekhar Sripada - 2005 - Cognition 94 (3):193-213.
    Recent studies of emotion mindreading reveal that for three emotions, fear, disgust, and anger, deficits in face-based recognition are paired with deficits in the production of the same emotion. What type of mindreading process would explain this pattern of paired deficits? The simulation approach and the theorizing approach are examined to determine their compatibility with the existing evidence. We conclude that the simulation approach offers the best explanation of the data. What computational steps might be used, however, in simulation-style emotion (...)
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  • Mirroring, mindreading, and simulation.Alvin Goldman - 2008 - In Jaime A. Pineda (ed.), Mirror Neuron Systems: The Role of Mirroring Processes in Social Cognition. Springer Science. pp. 311-330.
    What is the connection between mirror processes and mindreading? The paper begins with definitions of mindreading and of mirroring processes. It then advances four theses: (T1) mirroring processes in themselves do not constitute mindreading; (T2) some types of mindreading (“low-level” mindreading) are based on mirroring processes; (T3) not all types of mindreading are based on mirroring (“high-level” mindreading); and (T4) simulation-based mindreading includes but is broader than mirroring-based mindreading. Evidence for the causal role of mirroring in mindreading is drawn from (...)
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  • Mind, Reason and Imagination: Selected Essays in Philosophy of Mind and Language.Jane Heal - 2003 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Recent philosophy of mind has had a mistaken conception of the nature of psychological concepts. It has assumed too much similarity between psychological judgments and those of natural science and has thus overlooked the fact that other people are not just objects whose thoughts we may try to predict and control but fellow creatures with whom we talk and co-operate. In this collection of essays, Jane Heal argues that central to our ability to arrive at views about others' thoughts is (...)
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  • Mirroring, simulating and mindreading.Alvin I. Goldman - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (2):235-252.
    Pierre Jacob (2008) raises several problems for the alleged link between mirroring and mindreading. This response argues that the best mirroring-mindreading thesis would claim that mirror processes cause, rather than constitute, selected acts of mindreading. Second, the best current evidence for mirror-based mindreading is not found in the motoric domain but in the domains of emotion and sensation, where the evidence (ignored by Jacob) is substantial. Finally, simulation theory should distinguish low-level simulation (mirroring) and high-level simulation (involving pretense or imagination). (...)
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  • What is it like to be someone else? Simulation and empathy.Ian Ravenscroft - 1998 - Ratio 11 (2):170-185.
    This paper explores two models of empathy. One model places theory centre stage; the other emphasises our capacity to re‐enact fragments of another's mental life. I argue that considerations of parsimony strongly support the latter, simulative approach. My results have consequences for the current debate between the theory‐theory and simulation theory. That debate is standardly conceived as a debate about mental state attribution rather than about empathy. However, on the simulation model, empathy and mental state attribution involve a common mechanism. (...)
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  • Empathy for Pain Involves the Affective but not Sensory Components of Pain.T. Singer, B. Seymour, J. O’Doherty, H. Kaube, R. J. Dolan & C. D. Frith - 2004 - Science 303:1157-1162.
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  • Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology, by Gregory Currie and Ian Ravenscroft. [REVIEW]Christoph Hoerl - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (5):559-564.
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  • 33 Basal Ganglia and Cerebellar Circuits with the Cerebral Cortex.Peter L. Strick - 2004 - In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences III. MIT Press. pp. 453.
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