In recent years much effort has gone into the study of languages which strengthen the classical first-order predicate calculus in various ways. This effort has been motivated by the desire to find a language which is(I) strong enough to express interesting properties not expressible by the classical language, but(II) still simple enough to yield interesting general results. Languages investigated include second-order logic, weak second-order logic, ω-logic, languages with generalized quantifiers, and infinitary logic.

Large portions of mathematics such as algebra and geometry can be formalized using first-order axiomatizations. In many cases it is even possible to use a very well-behaved class of first-order axioms, namely, what are called coherent or geometric implications. Such class of axioms can be translated to inference rules that can be added to a sequent calculus while preserving its structural properties. In this work, this fundamental result is extended to their infinitary generalizations as extensions of sequent calculi for both (...) classical and intuitionistic infinitary logic. As an application, a simple proof of the infinitary Barr’s theorem without the axioms of choice is shown. (shrink)

§0. Introduction. In [16], Barwise described his graduate study at Stanford. He told of his interactions with Kreisel and Scott, and said how he chose Feferman as his advisor. He began working on admissible fragments of infinitary logic after reading and giving seminar talks on two Ph.D. theses which had recently been completed: that of Lopez-Escobar, at Berkeley, on infinitary logic [46], and that of Platek [58], at Stanford, on admissible sets.Barwise's work on infinitary logic and admissible sets is described (...) in his thesis [4], the book [13], and papers [5]—[16]. We do not try to give a systematic review of these papers. Instead, our goal is to give a coherent introduction to infinitary logic and admissible sets. We describe results of Barwise, of course, because he did so much. In addition, we mention some more recent work, to indicate the current importance of Barwise's ideas. Many of the central results are stated without proof, but occasionally we sketch a proof, to indicate how the ideas fit together.Chapters 1 and 2 describe infinitary logic and admissible sets at the time Barwise began his work, circa 1965. From Chapter 3 on, we survey the developments that took place after Barwise appeared on the scene.§1. Background on infinitary logic. In this chapter, we describe the situation in infinitary logic at the time that Barwise began his work. We need some terminology. By a vocabulary, we mean a set L of constant symbols, and relation and operation symbols with finitely many argument places. As usual, by an L-structureM, we mean a universe set M with an interpretation for each symbol of L. (shrink)

We show that every ℵα can be characterized by the Scott sentence of some countable model; moreover there is a countable structure whose Scott sentence characterizes ℵ1 but whose automorphism group fails the topological Vaught conjecture on analytic sets. We obtain some partial information on Ulm type dichotomy theorems for the automorphism group of Knight's model.