Thesis: Macro-level social phenomena are implemented through the (social) actions and minds of the individuals. Without an explicit theory of the agents' minds that founds, agents' behavior we cannot understand macro-level social phenomena, and in particular how they work. AntiThesis: Mind is not enough: the theory of individual (social) mind and action is not enough to explain several macro-level social phenomena. First, there are pre-cognitive, objective social structures that constrain the actions of the agents; second, there are emergent, unaware or (...) non-contractual forms of cooperation, organisation, and intelligence. Synthesis: The real challenge is how to reconcile, cognition with emergence, intention and deliberation with unknown or unplanned social functions and social order . Both objective structures and unplanned self-organising complex forms of social order and social function emerge from the interactions of agents and from their individual mental states; both these structures and self-organising systems feedback on agents' behaviors through the agents' individual minds. (shrink)

In this paper, a model of norms as cognitive objects is applied to establish connections between social conventions and prescriptions. Relevant literature on this issue, especially found in AI and the social sciences, will be shown to suffer from a dychotomic view: a conventionalistic view proposed by rationality and AI scientists; and a prescriptive view proposed by some philosophers of law (Kelsen 1934/1979, Hart 1961, Ross, 1958).In the present work, the attempt is made to fill the gap between these views (...) by putting forward a hypothesis concerning the process from perceived behavioural regularities to normative assumptions. The emergence of norms will be here seen as intrinsically intertwined with the emergence of normative beliefs. Unlike that assumed by the conventionalistic sight, the process of emergence is seen as a non-continuous phenomenon. A given behavioural regularity will be argued to give rise to a normative belief if and as long as that regularity is believed to be prescribed within the community. Two corollaries of this hypothesis will be examined: (1) unlike that implied by the conventionalistic view, the spreading of norms is not only due to a passive behavioural social influence (imitation) but also to an active cognitive one (the spreading of normative wants and beliefs); (2) unlike that assumed by the prescriptive view, a norm is not necessarily explicitly and deliberately issued by some normative authority, but is grounded upon the norm-addressees' beliefs that they are generally prescribed to comply with it. (shrink)

To understand the meaning of evolutionary equilibria, it is necessary to comprehend the ramifications of the evolutionary model. For instance, a full appreciation of Axelrod's The Evolution of Cooperation requires that we identify assumptions under which conditionally cooperative strategies, like Tit For Tat, are and are not evolutionarily stable. And more generally, when does stability fail? To resolve these questions we re-examine the very foundations of the evolutionary model. The results of this paper can be analytically separated into three parts. (...) The first part is conceptual: it identifies the evolutionary model's assumptions and shows how different assumptions imply different types of evolutionary stability. The second part is deductive: it establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for the types of evolutionary stability identified in the first part, and demonstrates in which games these kinds of stability can (and cannot) be attained. The third and final part is applied: it relates the general findings (which are independent of the specific payoffs of any particular evolutionary game) to the issue of the evolutionary stability of cooperation. Results on cooperation appear throughout the paper as they both exemplify and motivate the general results. These results essentially explain when cooperation is and is not stable, and why, thus shedding new light on the meaning and applicability of Axelrod's widely known claims. (shrink)

We sometimes violate social norms in order to express our views and to trigger public debates. Many extant accounts of social norms don’t give us any insight into this phenomenon. Drawing on Cristina Bicchieri’s work, I am putting forward an empirical hypothesis that helps us to understand such norm violations. The hypothesis says, roughly, that we often adhere to norms because we are systematically blind to norm-violating options. I argue that this hypothesis is independently plausible and has interesting consequences. It (...) implies, e.g., that some experimental paradigms for investigating social norms have hitherto unnoticed shortcomings. (shrink)

Community energy initiatives are set up by volunteers in local communities to promote sustainable energy behaviors and help to facilitate a sustainable energy transition. A key question is what motivates people to be involved in such initiatives. We propose that next to a stronger personal motivation for sustainable energy, people’s perception that their community is motivated to engage in sustainable energy and their involvement in the community may affect their initiative involvement. We tested this proposition with a questionnaire study among (...) inhabitants of seven local communities. Results suggested that community factors are uniquely related to initiative involvement next to personal sustainable energy motivations. In particular, stronger community identification and more interpersonal contact with other community members increased the likelihood that people become involved in a community initiative, but the perception of the sustainable energy motivation of one’s community was not uniquely related to initiative involvement. We discuss theoretical and practical implications of these findings. (shrink)

Decision theorists have attempted to accommodate several violations of decision theory’s axiomatic requirements by modifying how agents’ choice options are individuated and formally represented. In recent years, prominent authors have worried that these modifications threaten to trivialize decision theory, make the theory unfalsifiable, impose overdemanding requirements on decision theorists, and hamper decision theory’s internal coherence. In this paper, I draw on leading descriptive and normative works in contemporary decision theory to address these prominent concerns. In doing so, I articulate and (...) assess several different criteria for individuating and formally representing agents’ choice options. (shrink)

The analysis of how social conventions emerge and become established is rightly viewed as a significant study of great relevance to models of legal and social systems. Such conventions, however, do not operate in a monotonic fashion, i.e. the fact that a convention is recognised and complied with at some instant is no guarantee it will continue to be so indefinitely. In total rules and protocols may evolve, with or without the consent of individual members of the society, even to (...) the extent that some cease to be observed or effective. In this paper we examine a framework for examining such changes in behavioural conventions that uses a proposed “taxonomy of social conventions” as the basis of a qualitative model deriving from value-based argument systems. (shrink)

The analysis and theorizing about concepts like “knowledge” and “justification” has played a central role in much of epistemology in the past half century. This dissertation argues for the claim that we should understand this conceptual concern as one of design. Concepts are tools and the concepts of interest to epistemologists must be those that we can best use in service of our epistemic interests. On this understanding of the conceptual project, we determine the content of epistemic concepts, not by (...) consulting our naïve linguistic intuitions, but by determining what concepts will best help us express and enforce the epistemic norms that serve our interests. The determination of what concepts will do this job best will pull on information from many empirical sources like psychology and sociology. It will also require some means of determining what our epistemic interests are. In defending this view of the methodology of epistemology, we examine how one might go about designing and thinking about the purposes of an example epistemic concept: “epistemic ought”. We also consider how thinking about things from a design prospective can help in the determination of our epistemic interests by considering how design considerations feature in the debate between scientific realism and anti-realism. We also examine and respond to a few potential problems for this methodological view from Selim Berker’s arguments against epistemic teleology to problems with the design method’s potentially problematically self-undermining or self-reinforcing character. Advisor: David Henderson. (shrink)

This contribution provides interdisciplinary analysis of expressions of austerity-policies. It is argued that expressions of austerity-policies are meaningful if and only if intended addressees’ psychological states are adequately attuned and conceptual preconditions for implementation met. Furthermore, it is argued that if addressees are suitably psychologically attuned and preconditions met, utility will, by definition, be maximised and successful economical recovery enjoyed in equal measure among austerity-implementors. The paper is divided into five sections. In the first section the political scene is set (...) in which austerity-policies are expressed and terminology introduced. In the second section expressions of austerity-policies are dissected and analysis of reference conditions of such expressions provided. The third section reviews conceptual analysis of intending and acting together and relates it to jointly implementing austerity-policies. In the fourth section economical rationale behind expressions of austerity-policies is evaluated with reference to what in economical theory is called team-reasoning theory. It is concluded, in section five, that given suitably psychologically attuned implementors of austerity-policies, expressions of austerity-policies are economically rational. But we should be sceptical about their economical motivation: if the people whose actions are meant to implement austerity-policies are distinct from the people whose intentions are meant to be carried out, then it might appear, in the long run, that the former bear a burden for the better of the latter. (shrink)

If you put chimpanzees from different communities together you can expect mayhem - they are not keen on treating each other nicely. There is closely related species of apes, however, whose members have countless encounters with unrelated specimen on a daily basis and yet almost all get through the day in one piece - that species is us, homo sapiens. But what makes us get along, most of the time? Morality as such is, perhaps surprisingly, not a mainstream research topic (...) in social psychology. Most textbooks in the field do not even mention the term morality at all (and focus on 'prosociality' instead). This relative lack of 'coverage' might have to do with the difficulty of operationalising 'morality' in a fitting way (more on this below). However, morality certainly is a social phenomenon and therefore the collection of Fargas, Jussim, and Van Lange is certainly a step in the right direction; it offers an extensive overview of the field and is suggestive of the vast potential of studying morality through the lens of social psychology. (shrink)