The paper begins by reviewing two problems for fallibilism: the lottery problem, or the problem of explaining why fallible evidence, though otherwise excellent, is not enough to know that one will lose the lottery, and Gettier problems. It is then argued that both problems can be resolved if we note an important illocutionary force of knowledge attributions: namely, that when we attribute knowledge to someone we mean to give the person credit for getting things right. Alternatively, to say that a (...) person knows is to say that she got things right due to her own abilities, efforts and actions, rather than due to dumb luck, or blind chance, or something else. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: The Generality Problem and the Meta‐incoherence Problem The Psychological Plausibility Objection Renewed Preserving Virtue while Losing Perspective.

From the back cover: "Ever since Plato, philosophers have faced one central question: What is the scope and nature of human knowledge? In this volume the distinguished philosopher Ernest Sosa has collected his essays on this subject written over a period of twenty-five years. All the major topics of contemporary epistemology are covered: the nature of propositional knowledge, externalism versus internalism, foundationalism versus coherentism, and the problem of the criterion. The resulting book is a valuable resource for scholars and can (...) serve as a textbook for graduate seminars in epistemology.". (shrink)

Plantinga examines the nature of epistemic warrant; whatever it is that when added to true belief yields knowledge. This volume surveys current contributions to the debate and paves the way for his owm positive proposal in Warrant and Proper Function.

1 Knowledge and Justification This book is an investigation of one central problem which arises in the attempt to give a philosophical account of empirical ...

This is the first book devoted to the work of Ernest Sosa, one of the most influential contemporary epistemologists. Part of the acclaimed Philosophers and Their Critics series. The editor’s introduction serves as an introduction to Sosa’s epistemology. Contains critical essays by more than twenty of the most prominent epistemologists in the world, commenting on Sosa's work. Concludes with Sosa’s own reply to his critics.

This paper replies to various concerns raised in a symposium on Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry.

In this comment, we will focus on Greco’s brief for agent reliabilism in preference to simple reliabilism. Agent reliabilism differs from simple reliabilism primarily in requiring, not merely belief that results from a reliable process, but belief grounded in stable dispositions that make up the subject’s character.

Though I find the project significant and unprecedented in this way, I am not convinced that it is entirely successful, and I will try to explain here the grounds of my concern. We can begin with Greco’s list of requirements for an adequate theory of knowledge, and the relationship he sees between simple reliabilism and his own theory, agent reliabilism.

John Greco's Putting Skeptics in their Place presents an illuminating perspective on the nature of the skeptical problem and how to respond to it. Building on Ernest Sosa's Virtue Epistemology, Greco develops an account of knowledge he calls, “Agent Reliabilism”. In this essay, I will take up several issues regarding the details of this account.

This paper argues that Sosa’s virtue perspectivism fails to combine satisfactorily internalist and externalist features in a single theory. Internalism and externalism are reconciled at the price of creating a Gettier problem at the level of “reflective” or second-order knowledge. The general lesson to be learned from the critique of virtue perspectivism is that internalism and externalism cannot be combined by bifurcating justification and knowledge into an object-level and a meta-level and assigning externalism and internalism to different levels.

This paper reviews two skeptical arguments and argues that a reliabilist framework is necessary to avoid them. The paper also argues that agent reliabilism, which makes the knower the seat of reliability, is the most plausible version of reliabilism.

Despite various attempts to rectify matters, the internalism-externalism (I-E) debate in epistemology remains mired in serious confusion. I present a new account of this debate, one which fits well with entrenched views on the I-E distinction and illuminates the fundamental disagreements at the heart of the debate. Roughly speaking, the I-E debate is over whether or not certain of the necessary conditions of positive epistemic status are internal. But what is the sense of internal here? And of which conditions of (...) which positive epistemic status are we speaking? I argue that an adequate answer to these questions requires reference to what I call the no-defeater condition which is satisfied by a subjects belief B just in case she does not believe that B is defeated. I close by stating succinctly the main positions taken in the I-E debate, identifying the basic points of disagreement and suggesting fruitful courses for future discussion. (shrink)

This book, first published in 2000, is about the nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry. John Greco delineates three main theses: that a number of historically prominent skeptical arguments make no obvious mistake, and therefore cannot be easily dismissed; that the analysis of skeptical arguments is philosophically useful and important, and should therefore have a central place in the methodology of philosophy; and that taking skeptical arguments seriously requires us to adopt an externalist, reliabilist epistemology. Greco (...) argues that the importance of skeptical arguments is methodological. It is further argued that taking skeptical arguments seriously requires us to adopt a version of 'virtue epistemology', or a theory of knowledge that makes intellectual virtue central in the analysis of knowledge. The above methodology has consequences for moral and religious epistemology; in particular, a theory of moral perception is defended. (shrink)

The second major thesis of the book follows closely on the first: that the analysis of skeptical arguments is philosophically useful and important, and should therefore have a central role in the methodology of philosophy, and especially in the methodology of epistemology. A close analysis of skeptical arguments highlights our pre-theoretically plausible, but ultimately mistaken, assumptions about the nature of knowledge and evidence. Skeptical arguments are powerful just because their assumptions are so plausible pre-theoretically. But the arguments show us where (...) those assumptions lead, and thereby force us to rethink those assumptions. On this view, skeptical arguments constitute theoretical problems rather than practical problems. There is no “practical” or “existential” problem of skepticism. Rather, skeptical arguments show us that we need to rethink our assumptions about knowledge and evidence, and replace them with something better. (shrink)

In this comment, we will focus on Greco’s brief for agent reliabilism in preference to simple reliabilism. Agent reliabilism differs from simple reliabilism primarily in requiring, not merely belief that results from a reliable process, but belief grounded in stable dispositions that make up the subject’s character.

Though I find the project significant and unprecedented in this way, I am not convinced that it is entirely successful, and I will try to explain here the grounds of my concern. We can begin with Greco’s list of requirements for an adequate theory of knowledge, and the relationship he sees between simple reliabilism and his own theory, agent reliabilism.

I am grateful to both Richards, Foley and Fumerton, for the time and attention that they have given to my work. I have certainly learned from their excellent comments, just as I expected. Given the constraints, however, I must be selective in my response. First of all, I will aim to present my view of human knowledge in a broader context. Against this background I will then respond to several of the points they have made.