ZusammenfassungIm Gegensatz zu Beck und Allison, die dem Gefühl der Achtung eine mehr psychologische oder pädagogische Rolle zuschreiben, wird zu zeigen versucht, dass dieses ebenfalls eine wichtige systematische Funktion zu erfüllen hat: als Triebfeder artikuliert es den heiklen Übergang von der noumenalen zu den phänomenalen Sphäre. In dieser Weise wird erst erklärt, wie es überhaupt möglich ist, dass das Sittengesetz einen Einfluss auf menschliche Handlungen haben kann. Kants System wird dabei im strengen Sinne als Dualismus betrachtete – ein charakteristischer Zug, (...) der nicht durch Interpretationen der Art wie die Zwei‐Aspekten‐Lehre verwischt werden sollte. (shrink)

My purpose is to account for some oddities in what Kant did and did not say about "moral worth," and for another in what commentators tell us about his intent. The stone with which I hope to dispatch these several birds is-as one would expect a philosopher's stone to be-a distinction. I distinguish between two things Kant might have had in mind under the heading of moral worth. They come readily to mind when one both takes account of what he (...) actually said about it and notices a fact which he did not seem to notice: namely, that dutiful action- action which, whatever its motive, fulfills a duty-can be over- determined, and determined in particular by both respect for duty and some consortium of inclinations and prudenc. (shrink)

Writers on cognitive development differ on whether children are naturally inclined to maintain a veridical conception of the world or whether such an inclination emerges only gradually in the course of development. In either case, however, it is assumed that there is a consistent premium on veridicality. I argue against that assumption. Three different contexts are examined in which successful cognitive performance depends on temporarily setting aside what is known to be the case: counterfactual thinking, syllogistic reasoning and the comprehension (...) of connected discourse. (shrink)

Tyler Burge and other externalists about mental content have tried to accommodate privileged self-knowledge and to neutralize skepticism about one's ability to authoritatively know one's present thoughts. I show that, though Burgean compatibilism explains knowing it is p I believe, it doesn't explain how I can have privileged knowledge that the state I occupy is a state of believing rather than, say, a state of doubting. Moreover, given externalism, self-knowledge of attitudinal component is vulnerable to a certain kind of error (...) and so doesn't have the same kind of privilege as self-knowledge of current content. (shrink)