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  1. Propositions, circumstances, objects.Walter Edelberg - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (1):1 - 34.
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  • Theism and counterpossibles.Edward Wierenga - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 89 (1):87-103.
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  • Counterfactual conditionals and the presuppositions of induction.William Todd - 1964 - Philosophy of Science 31 (2):101-110.
    In this paper I will argue that Professor Goodman was correct in thinking that there is a problem concerning counterfactual conditionals, but that it is somewhat different from the problem he thought it to be, and is one that is even more basic. I will also try to show that this problem is distinct from Hume's "problem" of induction, and that additional assumptions have to be made for counterfactual induction beyond those required for other kinds of induction.
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  • Facts, Words and Beliefs.Alan R. White - 1971 - Philosophical Quarterly 21 (84):277-278.
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  • (2 other versions)Counterfactuals. [REVIEW]William Parry - 1973 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 44 (2):278-281.
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  • (1 other version)Real Conditionals.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Oxford, England: Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This book contends that insufficient attention has been paid to the syntax of conditionals, as investigated by linguists.
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  • Facts, Words and Beliefs.Nicholas J. Moutafakis - 1973 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 33 (4):595-597.
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  • A counterfactual account of essence.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2007 - The Reasoner.
    Kit Fine (1994. “Essence and Modality”, Philosophical Perspectives 8: 1-16) argues that the standard modal account of essence as de re modality is ‘fundamentally misguided’ (p. 3). We agree with his critique and suggest an alternative counterfactual analysis of essence. As a corollary, our counterfactual account lends support to non-vacuism the thesis that counterpossibles (i.e., counterfactual conditionals with impossible antecedents) are not always vacuously true.
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  • (2 other versions)A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals.Jonathan Bennett - 2003 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 66 (2):379-380.
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  • Strict finitism as a viable alternative in the foundations of mathematics.P. Van Bendegem - 1996 - Logique Et Analyse 37 (145):23-40.
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