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  1. (2 other versions)Logic: The Theory of Inquiry.John Dewey - 1938 - Philosophy 14 (55):370-371.
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  • (2 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
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  • Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language.J. Knobe - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):190-194.
    There has been a long-standing dispute in the philosophical literature about the conditions under which a behavior counts as 'intentional.' Much of the debate turns on questions about the use of certain words and phrases in ordinary language. The present paper investigates these questions empirically, using experimental techniques to investigate people's use of the relevant words and phrases. g.
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  • Wittgenstein and the groundlessness of our believing.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):255-272.
    In his final notebooks, published as On Certainty , Wittgenstein offers a distinctive conception of the nature of reasons. Central to this conception is the idea that at the heart of our rational practices are essentially arational commitments. This proposal marks a powerful challenge to the standard picture of the structure of reasons. In particular, it has been thought that this account might offer us a resolution of the traditional scepticism/anti-scepticism debate. It is argued, however, that some standard ways of (...)
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  • (1 other version)``Knowing and Asserting".Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489-523.
    Assertions are praised as true, informative, relevant, sincere, warranted, well-phrased, or polite. They are criticized as false, uninformative, irrelevant, insincere, unwarranted, ill-phrased, or rude. Sometimes they deserve such praise or criticism. If any respect in which performances of an act can deserve praise or criticism is a norm for that act, then the speech act of assertion has many norms. So has almost any act; jumps can deserve praise as long or brave, criticism as short or cowardly. But it is (...)
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  • (4 other versions)Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
    Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and truth which are synthetic, or grounded in fact. The other dogma is reductionism: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience. Both dogmas, I shall argue, are ill founded. One effect of abandoning them is, as (...)
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  • (1 other version)``Assertion, Knowledge, and Context".Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
    This paper brings together two positions that for the most part have been developed and defended independently of one another: contextualism about knowledge attributions and the knowledge account of assertion.
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  • Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.
    Introduction -- Fallibilism -- Contextualism -- Knowledge and reasons -- Justification -- Belief -- The value and importance of knowledge -- Infallibilism or pragmatic encroachment? -- Appendix I: Conflicts with bayesian decision theory? -- Appendix II: Does KJ entail infallibilism?
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  • (2 other versions)Proof of an external world.George Edward Moore - 1939 - Proceedings of the British Academy 25 (5):273--300.
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  • (2 other versions)Normativity and epistemic intuitions.Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich - 2001 - Philosophical Topics, 29 (1-2):429-460.
    In this paper we propose to argue for two claims. The first is that a sizeable group of epistemological projects – a group which includes much of what has been done in epistemology in the analytic tradition – would be seriously undermined if one or more of a cluster of empirical hypotheses about epistemic intuitions turns out to be true. The basis for this claim will be set out in Section 2. The second claim is that, while the jury is (...)
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  • Second-hand knowledge.Elizabeth Fricker - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):592–618.
    We citizens of the 21st century live in a world where division of epistemic labour rules. Most of what we know we learned from the spoken or written word of others, and we depend in endless practical ways on the technological fruits of the dispersed knowledge of others—of which we often know almost nothing—in virtually every moment of our lives. Interest has been growing in recent years amongst philosophers, in the issues in epistemology raised by this fact. One issue concerns (...)
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  • Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.
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  • (1 other version)Knowing and asserting.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489-523.
    This paper aims to identify the constitutive rule of assertion, conceived by analogy with the rules of a game. That assertion has such rules is by no means obvious; perhaps it is more like a natural phenomenon than it seems. One way to find out is by supposing that it has such rules, in order to see where the hypothesis leads and what it explains. That will be done here. The hypothesis is not perfectly clear, of course, but we have (...)
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  • Précis of knowledge and practical interests. [REVIEW]Jason Stanley - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):168–172.
    Our intuitions about whether someone knows that p vary even fixing the intuitively epistemic features of that person’s situation. Sometimes they vary with features of our own situation, and sometimes they vary with features of the putative knower’s situation. If the putative knower is in a risky situation and her belief that p is pivotal in achieving a positive outcome of one of the actions available to her, or avoiding a negative one, we often feel she must be in a (...)
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  • Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.
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  • (1 other version)Meaning.Herbert Paul Grice - 1957 - Philosophical Review 66 (3):377-388.
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  • (1 other version)Assertion, knowledge, and context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
    This paper uses the knowledge account of assertion (KAA) in defense of epistemological contextualism. Part 1 explores the main problem afflicting contextualism, what I call the "Generality Objection." Part 2 presents and defends both KAA and a powerful new positive argument that it provides for contextualism. Part 3 uses KAA to answer the Generality Objection, and also casts other shadows over the prospects for anti-contextualism.
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  • Contextualism and knowledge attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
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  • Belief, Degrees of Belief, and Assertion.Peter Milne - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):331-349.
    Starting from John MacFarlane's recent survey of answers to the question ‘What is assertion?’, I defend an account of assertion that draws on elements of MacFarlane's and Robert Brandom's commitment accounts, Timothy Williamson's knowledge norm account, and my own previous work on the normative status of logic. I defend the knowledge norm from recent attacks. Indicative conditionals, however, pose a problem when read along the lines of Ernest Adams' account, an account supported by much work in the psychology of reasoning. (...)
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  • Norms of Assertion: The Quantity and Quality of Epistemic Support.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (4):615-635.
    We show that the contemporary debate surrounding the question “What is the norm of assertion?” presupposes what we call the quantitative view, i.e. the view that this question is best answered by determining how much epistemic support is required to warrant assertion. We consider what Jennifer Lackey ( 2010 ) has called cases of isolated second-hand knowledge and show—beyond what Lackey has suggested herself—that these cases are best understood as ones where a certain type of understanding , rather than knowledge, (...)
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  • (2 other versions)The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions.John MacFarlane - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1.
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  • Pragmatics.S. C. Levinson - 1983 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 49 (3):531-532.
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  • Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.
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  • (1 other version)Assertion revisited: On the interpretation of two-dimensional modal semantics.Robert C. Stalnaker - 2006 - In Garc (ed.), Philosophical Studies. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 293-309.
    This paper concerns the applications of two-dimensional modal semantics to the explanation of the contents of speech and thought. Different interpretations and applications of the apparatus are contrasted. First, it is argued that David Kaplan's two-dimensional semantics for indexical expressions is different from the use that I made of a formally similar framework to represent the role of contingent information in the determination of what is said. But the two applications are complementary rather than conflicting. Second, my interpretation of the (...)
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  • (6 other versions)Logic and Conversation.H. Paul Grice - 1989 - In Herbert Paul Grice (ed.), Studies in the way of words. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 22-40.
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  • On Certainty.Ludwig Wittgenstein, G. E. M. Anscombe, G. H. Von Wright & Denis Paul - 1972 - Mind 81 (323):453-457.
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  • (1 other version)Assertion revisited: On the interpretation of two-dimensional modal semantics.Robert C. Stalnaker - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):299-322.
    This paper concerns the applications of two-dimensional modal semantics to the explanation of the contents of speech and thought. Different interpretations and applications of the apparatus are contrasted. First, it is argued that David Kaplan's two-dimensional semantics for indexical expressions is different from the use that I made of a formally similar framework to represent the role of contingent information in the determination of what is said. But the two applications are complementary rather than conflicting. Second, my interpretation of the (...)
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  • (3 other versions)Implicature: Intention, Convention, and Principle in the Failure of Gricean Theory.Wayne A. Davis - 2000 - Mind 109 (435):573-579.
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  • Dewey's New Logic: A Reply to Russell.Tom Burke - 1995 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 31 (4):887-905.
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  • (1 other version)Dewey's epistemology.Ruth Anna Putnam - 2010 - In Molly Cochran (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Dewey. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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